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Abstract 
In this paper, we examine why Chinese reverse merger (RM) firms have lower financial 
reporting quality. We find that while U.S. RM firms have similar financial reporting quality as 
matched U.S. IPO firms, Chinese RM firms exhibit lower financial reporting quality than 
Chinese ADR firms. We further find that Chinese RM firms exhibit lower financial reporting 
quality than U.S. RM firms. These results indicate that the use of RM process is associated with 
poor financial reporting quality only in firms from China, where the legal enforcement is weaker 
than U.S. In addition, we find that compared to Chinese ADR firms, Chinese RM firms have 
lower CEO turnover performance sensitivity, a measure of bonding incentives, and poorer 
corporate governance, which in turn explains the lower financial reporting quality in Chinese 
RM firms. Overall the results suggest that the RM process provides Chinese firms with low 
bonding incentives and poor governance the opportunity to access the U.S. capital markets, 
resulting in poor financial reporting quality in Chinese RM firms. 
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1. Introduction  
In this paper, we examine why Chinese reverse merger (RM) firms listed in the U.S. have 
lower financial reporting quality. This examination is motivated by the recent popularity of 
Chinese RM firms and the associated accounting problems in the last couple of years. In an RM 
deal, a U.S. public shell firm acquires a private operating firm. While the original U.S. public 
shell firm survives, the original private firm’s shareholders maintain control.1 Compared to initial 
public offerings (IPOs), the RM process is faster and less costly. RM has been the most popular 
alternative to IPOs for firms to go public in the U.S. since the 1990s (e.g., Floros and Shastri 
2009a). In recent years, many foreign firms, particularly those from China, entered the U.S. 
equity markets via RMs. Overall, there were 448 Chinese RM deals during the period of 2000-
2011.2 Over 90% of the foreign RM firms listed on the major stock exchanges are Chinese RM 
firms. 
Despite its popularity, the RM process has been criticized as a “back door” or “shortcut” to 
go public because RM firms bypass the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) and the 
market’s scrutiny in the listing process. Many suspect that foreign RMs only “rent” the benefits 
of listing in the U.S. without actually improving their corporate governance and financial 
reporting quality. These concerns are particularly noteworthy for Chinese RM firms, which are 
subject to weaker legal enforcement. In 2010 and 2011, many Chinese RM firms restated their 
financial statements, and many shareholders sued Chinese RM firms for frauds (e.g., Siegel and 
Wang 2013). These scandals trigger the rapid decline of the value of Chinese RM firms which 
has been exacerbated by short sellers. As a result, from mid-2010 to mid-2011, Chinese RM 
                                                 
1 A public shell company is defined as a public reporting registrant that has no or nominal operations and no or 
nominal assets, which usually consist solely of cash and cash equivalents (SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-8587). 
In general, shell companies can be classified as virgin shells, development stage shells, and natural shells. 
2 During the same period, there were 135 Chinese ADRs (IPO-ADRs) issued and listed on major stock exchanges 
and an additional 107 unsponsored or Level 1 Chinese ADRs. 
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firms lost 80% of their market value (Templin 2012).  
In this paper we examine whether the low financial reporting quality of Chinese RM firms 
results from the use of the RM method (i.e., the RM factor), the weak legal enforcement over 
Chinese firms (i.e., the China factor), or both? If it is the less scrutinized RM method that has 
caused the problem, we would expect U.S. RM firms to have lower financial reporting quality 
than their counterparts, the U.S. IPO firms, and Chinese RM firms to have lower financial 
reporting quality than other Chinese firms listed in the U.S., i.e., Chinese ADR (American 
depositary receipt) firms. If the cause is the weak legal enforcement over Chinese firms, we 
could expect Chinese RM firms to have lower financial reporting quality than U.S. RM firms. 
Built on the cross-listing literature, we further argue that the less scrutinized RM process allows 
the Chinese firms with weaker bonding incentives to access the U.S. capital markets. As such, 
Chinese RM firms would have poorer corporate governance and lower financial reporting quality 
than Chinese ADR firms.  
We investigate these questions based on a sample of 193 Chinese RM firms traded on the 
major stock exchanges or OTC bulletin board that have data required for the analyses. Because 
of the inherent difficulty in capturing financial reporting quality, we follow prior research (e.g., 
Hope et al. 2013) and use a wide range of measures: five accrual-based measures, conditional 
conservatism, and the likelihood of accounting restatements. To ensure that the differences in 
financial reporting quality are not driven by the differences in firm characteristics, we control for 
a comprehensive list of determinants of financial reporting quality.  
Before investigating the primary research question, we first investigate whether Chinese 
RM firms have lower financial reporting quality as commonly believed. We use U.S. IPO firms 
matched on the trading venue (NYSE, AMEX, NASDAQ, or OTC), industry, year, and size as 
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control firms. We find that the financial reporting quality of Chinese RM firms is indeed lower 
than that of the matched U.S. IPO firms. 
With respect to our research question, we document three major empirical results. First, we 
investigate whether the RM factor leads to lower financial reporting quality for U.S. and Chinese 
firms, respectively, when holding the legal enforcement constant. We find that the financial 
reporting quality of U.S. RM firms is comparable with that of U.S. IPO firms matched on the 
trading venue, industry, year, and size. In contrast, we find that the financial reporting quality of 
Chinese RM firms is lower than that of Chinese ADR firms. This result is interesting because the 
legal enforcement is the same for both types of Chinese firms and the regulatory requirement for 
on-going disclosure is arguably more stringent for Chinese RM firms than for Chinese ADR 
firms. These results indicate that the RM process does not lead to lower financial reporting 
quality for U.S. firms, but it does for Chinese firms. 
Second, we investigate whether the China factor is important when holding the RM process 
constant. We find that the reporting quality of Chinese RM firms is lower than that of U.S. RM 
firms. Given that both types of firms adopt the same listing method, this result indicates that the 
lack of screening and monitoring associated with the RM process leads to lower financial 
reporting quality only when the RM firms are subject to weak legal enforcement. (Due to the 
lack of data, we cannot test whether RM firms from other countries with weak legal enforcement 
have lower financial reporting quality like Chinese RM firms.) 
Third, we argue that Chinese firms with weak bonding incentives and poor corporate 
governance use the RM process to bypass the market and regulatory scrutiny, leading to lower 
financial reporting quality. To test this conjecture, we examine the differences in the strength of 
bonding incentives and corporate governance features between Chinese RM firms and Chinese 
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ADR firms. First, following Lel and Miller (2008), we use the CEO turnover-performance 
sensitivity to capture the strength of bonding incentives. We find that the sensitivity is lower for 
Chinese RM firms than for Chinese ADR firms, supporting the conjecture that Chinese RM 
firms have lower bonding incentives. Second, we find that compared to Chinese ADR firms, 
Chinese RM firms have higher insider ownership, lower foreign ownership, smaller boards, 
lower board independence, higher likelihood of CEO-Chairman duality, and lower CEO option-
based compensation. These results suggest that Chinese RM firms engage in fewer bonding 
activities than Chinese ADR firms, and these can lead to poorer financial reporting quality (Licht 
2003; Doidge et al. 2004; Siegel 2005; Leuz 2006). We further confirm that the likelihood of 
using RM transactions as explained by governance variables is associated with lower financial 
reporting quality. Third, to further triangulate the results, our cross-sectional analysis within 
Chinese RM firms indicates that those with stronger corporate governance and those with Big4 
auditors have better financial reporting quality, whereas issuing additional shares and being 
qualified for IPOs in China are associated with lower financial reporting quality.  
This study contributes to the literature in several important ways. First, this study sheds 
light on why Chinese RM firms have lower financial reporting quality. It answers the call for 
more research on the financial reporting quality of Chinese RM firms (PCAOB 2011). We find 
that choosing a non-Big4 auditor, avoiding IPOs in China when qualified, having poor corporate 
governance, and issuing additional shares are all associated with poor financial reporting quality 
of Chinese RM firms. These findings should be of interest to regulators in designing rules to 
enhance the financial reporting quality of foreign RM firms, and to the investors who trade on 
the shares of these firms.  
Second, our paper contributes to the literature on the financial reporting quality of foreign 
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firms listed in the U.S. by investigating the impact of adopting the most popular listing method in 
recent years—the RM—on financial reporting quality (Lang et al. 2003; Lang et al. 2006; Leuz 
2006; Ndubizu 2007). Prior research on the financial reporting quality of cross-listed firms 
generally excludes RM cases. In particular, our paper builds on and extends Lang et al. (2006) in 
several important dimensions. First and foremost, the objectives of the two studies are different. 
Lang et al. (2006) compare the financial reporting quality of ADRs and U.S. domestic firms. In 
the China context, that comparison would be that between Chinese ADRs and U.S. IPO firms. 
Yet our objective is to investigate why Chinese RM firms have low financial reporting quality. 
Second, one can infer from Lang et al.’s (2006) conclusion that the weak investor protection in 
China would lead Chinese RM firms to have lower financial reporting quality than U.S. IPO 
firms or U.S. RM firms. However, Lang et al.’s (2006) analysis does not shed light on the 
differences between U.S. RM firms and U.S. IPO firms or the differences between Chinese RM 
and Chinese ADR firms. These comparisons enhance our understanding of the impact of RM 
process on U.S. firms and Chinese firms, respectively, and help us nail down the reasons for why 
Chinese RM firms have lower financial reporting quality. Lastly, we examine whether Chinese 
RM firms have lower bonding incentives and weaker corporate governance than Chinese ADR 
firms and whether these differences contribute to lower financial reporting quality in Chinese 
RM firms.  
Third, this study contributes to the cross-listing literature (Licht 2003; Siegel 2005; Lang et 
al. 2006; Leuz 2006). The analysis of Chinese RM and ADR firms is particularly interesting 
because it highlights the importance of listing choices and the analysis is not affected by the 
country-specific effect. The results suggest that when alternative listing choices are available, 
while some firms choose the more stringent listing method, adopt better corporate governance 
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mechanisms, and hire high quality auditors to improve their financial reporting quality, others 
choose the less stringent listing method to bypass regulator and market scrutiny.  
This paper is related to, but significantly different from, several concurrent studies that 
examine various issues surrounding Chinese RM firms. Focusing on the fundamentals, Lee et al. 
(2013) find that Chinese RM firms are more likely to survive and have better performance than 
other RM firms. Note that Lee et al.’s results are different from the findings of earlier studies of 
reverse merger firms (e.g., Adjei et al. 2008; Jindra et al. 2012), potentially due to differences in 
the research design (e.g., choices of control firms). Darrough et al. (2013) examine the spillover 
effects of Chinese fraud firms on non-fraud Chinese firms. They find that non-fraud Chinese 
firms also experience a significant drop in stock prices in late 2010 and 2011. He et al. (2013) 
and Ang et al. (2012) arrive at similar conclusion as Darrough et al. (2013) and further find that 
many Chinese firms delist afterwards. Unlike these studies, our paper examines why Chinese 
RM firms have low financial reporting quality.  
Note that our analyses focus on the financial reporting quality, not investors’ perception of 
it. When we used the earnings response coefficient to capture investors’ perception of financial 
reporting quality, we find that Chinese RM firms do not differ from other firms. This result is 
consistent with the crash of Chinese RM firms experienced in 2011 and the evidence in the 
literature of accounting restatements (e.g., Ettredge et al. 2012).  In addition, we find that 
Chinese RM firms that have lower financial reporting quality experience lower future stock 
returns than those with higher financial reporting quality. 
Our paper is more closely related to a concurrent study, Givoly et al. (2012). Givoly et al. 
(2012) also find that Chinese RM firms have lower financial reporting quality than matched U.S. 
IPO firms. They attribute this result broadly to the cultural and institutional differences between 
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the U.S. and China without providing any direct evidence. Unlike Givoly et al. (2012), we 
conduct a more comprehensive analysis. Our results suggest that neither the RM process nor the 
China factor alone leads to poor financial reporting quality: it is the combination of the two that 
results in low financial reporting quality. In addition, we compare Chinese RM firms and 
Chinese ADR firms. The results from this comparison indicates that bonding incentives and 
corporate governance are associated with the listing choice of Chinese firms, and such incentives 
and governance characteristics affect financial reporting quality. These findings suggest that the 
lack of scrutiny associated with the RM process enables firms with weak bonding incentives to 
list in the U.S., leading to low financial reporting quality.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the background of 
Chinese RM firms and related research and develops hypotheses. Section 3 presents the sample 
selection, variable measurements, and descriptive statistics. Section 4 describes the research 
design and empirical results with regard to the financial reporting quality of Chinese RM firms. 
Section 5 reports the analysis of the strength of bonding incentive among U.S.-listed Chinese 
firms and how it relates to financial reporting quality, and Section 6 examines the market 
perception of Chinese RM firms’ financial reporting quality. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Background, related research, and hypothesis development 
2.1 Background on Chinese RM firms 
Foreign firms, including Chinese ones, have various incentives to access the U.S. capital 
markets, as documented in prior research. The most frequently cited reason is to obtain cheaper 
capital and increase liquidity (e.g., Pagano et al. 2002; Licht 2003).  Other benefits include 
increased shareholder base, increased visibility, increases growth, diversification, and economies 
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of scale. As noted by the SEC (2011), Investor Bulletin on Reverse Mergers, obtaining access to 
the U.S. capital markets also improves the operating company’s reputation with its customers 
and potential acquirers. Finally, in China, running a company listed on a U.S. stock exchange is 
sometimes regarded as a trophy and increases the CEO’s social status. For example, Gillis 
(2011a) points out that some communities in China even give awards to firms that succeed in 
doing so. If these transactions are set up just to feed the ego of the CEO, then there is little 
incentive for them to improve financial reporting quality (Gillis 2011a).3 The prestige motivation 
may also explain why a disproportional number of Chinese RM firms are “uplisted” to the major 
stock exchanges so quickly, compared with U.S. RM firms and other foreign RM firms.4 All 
these potential benefits prompt Chinese firms to list in the U.S. 
In recent years, RM has become the most popular approach for Chinese firms to go public 
in the U.S. In a typical Chinese RM transaction, a U.S. public shell company acquires a Chinese 
private firm through a share exchange. The U.S. public firm survives, but the directors and 
managers are replaced by the executives of the Chinese private firm. Because the Chinese firm 
effectively inherits the public status of the U.S. firm, its filing status remains that of a U.S. 
domestic firm and is subject to the same disclosure regulations as other U.S. domestic firms 
(Licht 2003). 
One of the reasons for the popularity of RMs is that compared to other approaches (e.g., 
IPOs), the reverse merger process is faster and cheaper. Adjei et al. (2008) estimate that the cost 
of setting up a public shell company and completing the reverse merger transaction can be as low 
as $50,000, while completing an IPO can cost millions of dollars. Consistent with this notion, 
                                                 
3 “Understanding Chinese Frauds,” http://chinaaccountingblog.com/weblog/understanding-chinese-fraud.html 
4 In a similar vein, Hung et al. (2012) find that SOEs with strong political connections are more likely to list on 
oversea exchanges because managers of these firms are more likely to gain private benefits, such as receiving 
political media coverage or a promotion to a senior government position subsequent to the oversea listing.   
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prior research finds that smaller, younger, and poorly performing firms are more likely to 
undertake RM transactions rather than using alternatives such as IPOs (Adjei et al. 2008; Jindra 
et al. 2012). Thus, despite the disadvantages of RMs – less funding, little support from market 
intermediaries, being traded on the OTC market (Feldman 2009), the number of Chinese RM 
firms has grown rapidly in the past decade.  
However, Chinese RM firms, especially those listed on the major stock exchanges, have 
drawn significant attention recently due to an increasing number of accounting fraud cases in late 
2010 and 2011. In early 2011, the SEC suspended the trading of several firms’ shares and 
revoked the securities registration of several others, primarily due to financial reporting 
concerns. High-profile short-sellers also targeted Chinese RM firms.5 In response to the 
widespread issues, in July 2011, the SEC issued a bulletin warning investors of investing in RM 
firms. In the same year, the PCAOB issued a research note highlighting the problems with 
Chinese RM firms, particularly the concerns with the audit quality.  
Many commentators and regulators attribute the issues to the loopholes in the RM 
transaction process. For example, in April 2011, Luis Aguilar, one of the SEC’s commissioners 
commented:6 
There are a lot of different ways for companies to access the public markets, but not all of 
them are equal. They differ in the quality of the disclosures, the time investors and the SEC 
typically have to consider them, and the protections that investors have against false and 
fraudulent statements... In the world of backdoor registrations to gain entry into the U.S. 
public market, the use by Chinese companies has raised some unique issues... There appear 
to be systematic concerns with the quality of the auditing and financial reporting. 
 
                                                 
5 For example, J Capital Research issued a research report on China Green Agriculture on Jan 5, 2011, Muddy 
Waters on Sino-Forest on June 2, 2011, and Citron Research on several Chinese RM firms in 2011. 
6 An excerpt from the speech by SEC Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar: Facilitating Real Capital Formation, 
at the SEC Council of Institutional Investors Spring Meeting at Washington, D.C. on April 4, 2011, 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch040411laa.htm. 
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That is, investors and the SEC have less time to evaluate the firm during the RM process.7 
Compared to the RM process, the IPO process provides ample opportunities for information 
dissemination, including road shows and detailed prospectuses. While IPOs must file financial 
reports with the SEC for approval before going public, RMs only have to file the consolidated 
financial reports (super 8K) after the transaction. In addition, a super 8K is not as detailed as a 
prospectus. For example, a super 8K usually provides information for the last two years, while a 
prospectus typically provides information for the last five years. Most of the super 8Ks lack 
complete and detailed financial statements.  
The protection that investors have against false financial statements is also much weaker in 
the RM cases than in the IPO ones. Because IPO cases involve the issuance of new shares, 
investment banks are also responsible for the representational faithfulness of the financial 
statement. In contrast, no underwriters are involved in RM cases, and most of the law firms or 
auditors involved in RM deals tend to be small. The scrutiny from financial analysts and 
institutional investors is also lacking because most of the RM firms are traded on the OTC 
market.  
However, one should distinguish between regulatory requirements for the listing process 
and the regulatory requirements related to on-going reporting. While the RM process is 
characterized by weak scrutiny, the firms are subject to the same regulatory requirements for the 
on-going financial reporting as firms that go public via IPOs. For example, when discussing the 
regulatory requirements and auditing standards for Chinese RM firms on CNBC’s Fast Money, 
                                                 
7 The RM transaction can progress so fast that it is possible for an RM firm to be listed on a major stock exchange 
even before the required financial statement is filed with the SEC. For example, a Chinese firm, SinoCoking, 
merged into a shell company, Alleauctions.com, on February 5, 2010. Three days later, Form 8-K was filed and the 
company was quoted on the OTC market. Thirteen days later, the stock up-listed to Nasdaq. However, it is not until 
March 18th that SinoCoking amended their 8-K filings to include the required audited financial statements with the 
SEC. 
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the CEO of NASDAQ OMX Group, Bob Greifeld, declared that “Let’s make it clear – it’s 
identical.” Please refer to Templin (2012) for more detailed discussions on the regulatory and 
legal issues related to Chinese RM firms.  
In response to the widespread issues with Chinese RM firms, the SEC adopted new rules in 
November 2011, requiring reverse merger firms to go through a one-year “seasoning period” and 
maintain a minimum share price for an extended period before their shares can be traded on the 
major stock exchanges (NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ). Whether the new rules are effective 
remains to be seen.   
2.2 Related research 
This paper is broadly related to the cross-listing literature, particularly those studies that 
examine the impact of cross-listing on financial reporting quality. There is a long line of research 
that examines the impact of cross-listing on foreign firms’ corporate decisions and firm value. 
Please refer to Coffee (2002), Licht (2003), Siegel (2005), Leuz (2006) for more detailed 
discussion. Note that prior studies on cross-listing focus on ADRs and do not include RM firms 
in their samples. In terms of the relationship between cross-listing and financial reporting 
quality, Lang et al. (2003) find that compared to firms in their home countries, firms cross-listed 
in the U.S. reflect bad news in a more timely manner, have a higher correlation between earnings 
and share prices, and appear to be less likely to engage in earnings management. Bailey et al. 
(2006) also document that cross-listed firms have higher earnings response coefficients (ERCs) 
than firms that are not cross-listed.  
In addition to comparing cross-listed firms with firms listed in their own countries, 
previous studies also examine the financial reporting quality of cross-listed firms relative to U.S. 
domestic firms. For example, Lang et al. (2006) find that cross-listed firms are more likely to 
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engage in earnings management than U.S. domestic firms. Ndubizu (2007) finds similar 
evidence, particularly at the time of cross-listing. He also finds that non-IPO ADR firms do not 
differ from IPO ADR firms in financial reporting quality.  
The aforementioned studies are generally built on the bonding hypothesis (e.g., Coffee 
1999; Stulz 1999), which states that firms with poor minority shareholder protection signal their 
desire to respect shareholder rights by listing in a jurisdiction with higher market scrutiny, 
tougher regulations, and better enforcement. However, the strength of legal bonding has been 
challenged recently. First, ADRs are exempt from some requirements related to disclosure and 
corporate governance (e.g., Licht 2003; Leuz 2006). For example, ADRs are exempt from the 
proxy and insider trading provisions of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, from quarterly 
reporting requirements, and from Regulation Fair Disclosure. In addition, they do not need to 
prepare the full U.S. GAAP financial statement and only need to prepare 20-Fs. Second, legal 
enforcement actions against foreign firms are rare and often result in insignificant penalties (e.g., 
Siegel 2005; Licht et al. 2013). Such weak enforcement over foreign firms reduces managers’ 
incentives to improve corporate governance and provide high-quality financial statements. Given 
the recent development in the cross-listing literature, some researchers extend the scope of 
bonding to include not only the legal bonding mechanism but also a dynamic reputation building 
process, through which mangers gradually build a reputation for not expropriating minority 
shareholders by, for example, voluntarily improving corporate governance and hiring reputable 
auditors and investment bankers (Siegel 2005; Marosi and Massoud 2008). These market players 
can further monitor foreign firms and improve the information environment, thereby reducing 
the information asymmetry between controlling and minority shareholders.  
2.3 Hypothesis development on the financial reporting quality of Chinese RM firms 
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In this section, we develop the hypotheses on why Chinese RM firms have lower financial 
reporting quality. We first explore the impact of the RM factor for U.S. firms by comparing U.S. 
RM firms and U.S. IPO firms, and for Chinese firms, by comparing Chinese RM and Chinese 
ADR firms. We then explore the China factor by comparing Chinese RM and U.S. RM firms. 
Lastly, we develop hypotheses related to Chinese firms’ bonding incentives and corporate 
governance. The argument is largely built on the cross-listing literature, as discussed above. Prior 
research on cross-listing suggests three primary factors that can affect the financial reporting 
quality of foreign firms listed in the U.S.:  
1. Enhanced disclosure requirements and market scrutiny in the U.S. These are the 
foundations of the bonding mechanism and can improve the financial reporting quality 
of foreign firms, compared to their counterparts in the home countries (e.g., Lang et al. 
2003; Leuz 2006; Gong et al. 2013). However, we are not comparing Chinese firms 
listed in the U.S. versus those listed in China. As such, this factor is not relevant for our 
study. 
2. Investor protection in the home country and the SEC enforcement on foreign firms. For 
foreign firms from countries with weak investor protection, being listed in the U.S. can 
improve their financial reporting quality. However the weak investor protection in their 
home countries and the weak SEC enforcement on foreign companies, as discussed in 
the recent cross-listing literature, can reduce the bonding incentives and lead to lower 
financial reporting quality, compared to their U.S. counterparts (e.g., Lang et al. 2003; 
Siegel 2005; Leuz 2006; Gong et al. 2013). 
3. Listing choices and firm level bonding incentives and governance. How a foreign firm 
accesses the U.S. capital markets could affect its financial reporting quality because of 
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differences in the level of scrutiny during the listing process. What is particularly 
relevant for this paper is whether the RM process is associated with lower financial 
reporting quality. While many firms choose the RM process because it is cheaper and 
faster, others might choose it because the scrutiny is less stringent. Therefore, firms 
with weaker bonging incentives and poorer governance may choose the RM process. 
Many studies argue that firms’ incentives and governance have a significant impact on 
their financial reporting quality than the accounting rules in general (e.g., Ball et al. 
2003) and for foreign firms listed in the U.S. in particular (Leuz 2006). 
Below we elaborate on the impact of these factors in the corresponding sections when applicable. 
The RM factor 
As discussed in detail in Section 2.1, the potential loopholes associated with RM 
transactions, particularly the lack of market and regulatory scrutiny, have drawn attention from 
both the investment community and the regulators. As discussed above, the weak scrutiny by 
both regulators and market participants, along with other problems with the RM process, can 
result in lower financial reporting quality for RM firms than for their counterparts.  
To isolate the potential RM effect for U.S. firms, we compare U.S. RM firms with U.S. 
IPO firms. Since these two groups of firms differ only in the listing process, if the loopholes in 
the RM process are the main driver, we expect U.S. RM firms to have lower financial reporting 
quality than U.S. IPO firms: 
H1: Ceteris paribus, the financial reporting quality of U.S. RM firms is lower than that of 
the U.S. IPO firms. 
   
 To isolate the potential RM effect for Chinese firms, we compare the financial reporting 
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quality of Chinese RM firms with that of Chinese ADR firms.8 This comparison holds constant 
the legal enforcement because both Chinese RM firms and Chinese ADR firms are subject to the 
same legal enforcement and they only differ in the listing choices. Thus, if the loopholes in the 
RM process are the main driver, our second hypothesis is: 
H2: Ceteris paribus, the financial reporting quality of Chinese RM firms is lower than that 
of the Chinese ADR firms. 
 
However, compared to Chinese ADR firms, Chinese RM firms are subject to more 
stringent regulations on on-going reporting. As noted in Leuz (2006) and Licht (2003), ADR 
firms are exempt from the proxy and insider trading provisions of the Securities and Exchange 
Act of 1934 and the quarterly reporting requirement, among other things. In contrast, because 
Chinese RM firms inherit the filing status of U.S. shell firms, they must file just as frequent and 
detailed disclosures as U.S. IPO firms. This difference in regulatory requirements for on-going 
reporting likely biases against finding results consistent with H2.  
The China factor 
The weak legal enforcement on Chinese firms is in large part due to the difficulties 
experienced by U.S. regulators in gathering evidence from China and the difficulties experienced 
by investors in the U.S. in protecting their legal rights (e.g., Cheng et al. 2012; McMahon 2012). 
The problem is exacerbated by the lack of jurisdiction of the U.S. enforcement officials and the 
lack of intention and/or resources of Chinese regulators to monitor and discipline Chinese RM 
firms (Jindra et al. 2012; Siegel and Wang 2013).9 Many Chinese RM firms admit that both 
                                                 
8 Most non-RM Chinese firms listed in the U.S. are ADR firms and our analyses focus only on Chinese ADR firms 
to avoid confounding effects. 
9 For example, Jindra et al. (2012) argue that “while the incidence of litigation appears higher for CRM [Chinese 
RM] firms, the cost of litigation as measured by dollar settlement amounts does not appear large, especially when 
compared to other settlements (page 24).” 
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investor protection in China and U.S. enforcements are weak.10, 11 Templin (2012) notes that 
regulators have weak enforcement power over not only Chinese RM firms, but also their Chinese 
auditors. He also argues that Chinese auditors, usually carrying out the audit work for the U.S. 
auditors hired by Chinese RM firms, are short of skills and sometimes have lower ethical 
standards. All these problems can lead to poor financial reporting quality.12 
To study the impact of the China factor – the effect of weak legal enforcement over 
Chinese firms on the financial reporting quality, we would like to control for the listing choice. 
For this purpose, we compare the reporting quality of Chinese RM and U.S. RM firms. Both 
groups of firms go through the same listing process and are subject to the same financial 
reporting rules. If weak legal enforcement leads to lower financial reporting quality, then we 
expect that Chinese RM firms have lower financial reporting quality than U.S. RM firms: 
H3: Ceteris paribus, the financial reporting quality of Chinese RM firms is lower than that 
of the U.S. RM firms. 
 
Chinese RM firms and Chinese ADR firms: bonding incentives and corporate governance 
                                                 
10 For example, with respect to the weak U.S. enforcement, on page 19 of their prospectus, China Display state that. 
“It will be extremely difficult to acquire jurisdiction and enforce liabilities against our officers, directors and assets 
based in China. Substantially all of our assets will be located outside of the United States and our officers and 
directors will reside outside of the United States. As a result, it may not be possible for United States investors to 
enforce their legal rights, to effect service of process upon our directors or officers or to enforce judgments of 
United States courts predicated upon civil liabilities and criminal penalties of our directors and officers under 
Federal securities laws. Moreover, we have been advised that China does not have treaties providing for the 
reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgments of courts with the United States. Further, it is unclear if 
extradition treaties now in effect between the United States and China would permit effective enforcement of 
criminal penalties of the Federal securities laws.”  
11 For example, with respect to weak investor protection in China, China Crescent stated in its 10K: “Uncertainties 
with respect to the Chinese legal system could limit the legal protections available to you and us. We conduct 
substantially our business through our subsidiaries in China. Our subsidiaries are generally subject to laws and 
regulations applicable to foreign investments in China and, in particular, laws applicable to foreign-invested 
enterprises. … However, since the Chinese legal system evolve rapidly, the interpretations of many laws, 
regulations, and rules are not always uniform, and enforcement of these laws, regulations, rules involve 
uncertainties, which may limit legal protections available to you and us. In addition, any litigation in China may be 
protracted result in substantial costs and diversion of resources and management attention. As a result, it may be 
difficult for investors to effect process in the United States or to enforce a judgment obtained in the United States 
against our Chinese operations and subsidiaries.” 
12 International studies also find that financial reporting quality is higher in countries with strong investor protection 
(e.g., Hung 2001; DeFond et al. 2007). 
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When a Chinese firm intends to access the U.S. capital markets, it can to some extent 
choose to use the RM approach or other approaches (e.g., ADR). (While all firms can 
theoretically choose the RM approach, not all are eligible to use ADRs.) In light of this potential 
self-selection issue, we further examine the strength of the bonding incentives and the corporate 
governance of Chinese RM firms and Chinese ADR firms to better understand why financial 
reporting quality differs in these two groups of firms.  
The bonding mechanism originates from the idea that foreign firms voluntarily subject 
themselves to stringent regulations and close monitoring from market participants in a more 
developed capital market in exchange for cheaper capital. Lel and Miller (2008) demonstrate 
how bonding incentives interact with the legal environment. Using the sensitivity of CEO 
turnover to performance to capture the strength of bonding incentives, they find that firms from 
regimes with weak investor protection have stronger bonding incentives. However, Ball et al. 
(2003) argue that only looking at regulations but ignoring the preparers’ incentives can lead to 
misleading inferences. They document that when the incentive for increasing financial reporting 
quality is low, stringent standards do not necessarily lead to high-quality financial reporting. 
Subsequent studies, such as Chi et al. (2013), find that incentives, rather than rules, drive 
financial reporting decisions. Recent studies on the limitation of the bonding hypothesis also 
highlight the importance of companies’ incentives to bond. High quality foreign firms can 
distinguish themselves by undertaking measures to protect minority shareholders’ rights, 
including choosing a more stringent listing method, improving corporate governance, and 
engaging more reputable auditors.  
It is possible that Chinese RM firms have particularly weak bonding incentives because 
most of the insiders from the original private firms usually do not cash out after the foreign RM 
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transactions (Floros and Shastri 2009b). Therefore, unlike the ADR firms, as examined in Coffee 
(2002), in which insiders enjoyed an increase in valuation premium, the existing shareholders of 
RM firms do not immediately benefit from bonding.  
We conjecture that most of the corporate governance-related decisions made by U.S.-listed 
Chinese firms are tied to the strength of their bonding incentive. Coffee (2002) notes that being 
subject to the monitoring of reputable market intermediaries, such as high-quality auditors, can 
signal their intention to protect minority shareholders’ rights. Firms can also enhance their 
reputation by strengthening their corporate governance. Stulz (1999) argues that important 
monitoring mechanisms, such as the independence of the board, is likely intensified by 
globalization in the form of cross-listings, and that these mechanisms would vary across firms, 
even for those from the same home market. In a weak legal enforcement environment, adopting 
more effective corporate governance mechanisms can serve as a strong signal of firms’ bonding 
incentives.  
This discussion motivates us to examine the potential differential bonding incentives and 
corporate governance of Chinese RM firms and Chinese ADR firms. Our last set of hypotheses is 
thus: 
H4a: Ceteris paribus, Chinese RM firms have weaker bonding incentives than Chinese 
ADR firms. 
 
H4b: Ceteris paribus, the strength of corporate governance is weaker in Chinese RM firms 
than in Chinese ADR firms. 
 
3. Sample and data  
3.1 Sample selection 
We rely on multiple sources to compile the list of Chinese RM firms. We start with the list 
of Chinese RM firms from Dealflow Media. Dealflow Media tracks RM deals with US shell 
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companies starting from 2001. From Dealflow Media, we identify 432 reverse merger deals 
involving Chinese private companies in the period 2001-2011.  We then cross-check the list with 
Chinese RM firms listed on NYSE, NYSE Amex, and NASDAQ from the Bloomberg report 
published in June 2011 and the U.S.-listed Chinese firms included in Halter USX China Index 
and CYNES.com.13 To ensure that these firms are listed through the RM method, we go through 
these firms’ annual filings and websites. These steps yield 16 additional Chinese RM firms, 
resulting in the initial sample of 448 Chinese RM firms in 2000-2011.  
To be included in our final sample, Chinese RM firms need to satisfy the following criteria: 
(1) the headquarter of the firm and the majority of the operations are in China; (2) SEC filings 
(i.e., the first 10K and 8K filings) are available to verify whether a U.S. shell company is  
involved; 14 (3) the accounting data are available from Compustat; and (4) firms are not in 
finance (SIC 6000-6999) or utilities industries (SIC4900- 4949).  As a result, 6, 4, 238, and 7 
firms are excluded due to the above four requirements, respectively. Our final sample includes 
193 Chinese RM firms in the period of 2000-2011.15 Of these firms, 116 are eventually listed on 
the major exchanges and 77 are still traded on the OTC market at the time of data collection.  
                                                 
13 We rely on the Halter USX China Index to ensure the accuracy of the list. The Halter USX China Index includes 
Chinese firms that are listed on the NYSE, NYSE-AMEX, or NASDAQ and have a market-cap greater than $50 
million. The components of the index are updated quarterly based on the basic market value requirement and other 
factors. To avoid the survivorship bias, we collect a historical list of Chinese issues from quarterly reports of the 
Halter USX China Index since 2003.    
14 We limit our RM firms with shell firms for two reasons. First, an RM transaction between two operating firms is 
similar to regular merger and acquisitions except that it is the target, not the acquirer, that survives. A lot of 
reputable firms are established through this method, including Blockbuster, Occidental Petroleum, RadioShack, the 
NYSE, Texas Instruments, and Berkshire Hathaway. In contrast, the primary objective of RMs involving shell firms 
is for the private firms to go public. Second, the majority of the U.S. RM deals in our sample period are conducted 
through merging with shell firms; therefore, focusing on RMs with shell firms can facilitate a more appropriate 
comparison. 
15 Our Chinese RM sample size, 193 firms, is comparable to that of recent reverse merger studies, 118 in Lee at al. 
(2013), 106 in Givoly et al. (2012), and 114 in Ang et al. (2012). Our sample is slightly smaller than He et al.’s 
(2013) (287 firms) and Darrough et al.’s (2012) (265 firms) because we require comprehensive data coverage from 
Compustat to measure various financial reporting quality proxies, and many firms, particularly OTC firms, are 
excluded as a result. Compustat covers firms traded on the OTC market only if their shares are priced at $0.01 or 
above and traded fairly consistently. Including the really small and illiquid firms traded on the OTC can introduce 
bias to the analyses, without a clear benefit due to their economic insignificance. 
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Note that we include both firms traded on the major stock exchanges and on the OTC 
market to increase the generalizability of the results. The drawback of including OTC firms is 
that OTC firms are much smaller than those traded on the major stock exchanges. Also, firms 
traded on the OTC market are subject to less stringent market monitoring, such as that of 
institutional investors and financial analysts. These differences likely introduce noise to the 
analyses. To mitigate the impact, we match the control firms on the trading venue, as discussed 
in detail later. We also conduct an untabulated sensitivity test by excluding OTC firms from the 
sample and the results are quantitatively similar.  
The sample selection process for U.S. RM firms is similar. From Dealflow Media, we 
identify 1,204 reverse merger deals involving U.S. private and shell companies.16 Applying the 
same criteria, we obtain 273 U.S. RM firms. Of these, 65 uplist to major stock exchanges and 
208 are traded on the OTC market.   
We do not include non-Chinese foreign RM firms in our study because of their small 
sample size. There are 180 reverse merge deals conducted by foreign private companies in the 
period 2001-2011. However, the majority of these firms are still listed on the Pink Sheets market. 
Only four firms eventually move up to the major stock exchanges and 30 are listed on the OTC 
market.17 For these 24 foreign RM firms, we only obtain 93 firm-years’ data from Compustat. 
This small sample makes it impossible to examine the impact of legal origin or investor 
protection on the reporting quality of these RM firms as a stand-alone sample. Including these 
observations in the U.S. RM sample or Chinese RM sample, as done in Givoly et al. (2012), will 
only add noise to the analyses because of the differences in the legal infrastructure and investor 
                                                 
16 Even though Dealflow Media states that only reverse mergers involving shell companies are included, we find 
that eight “shell” companies were traded on the major stock exchanges before the RM deals. Excluding those firms 
does not change our results.     
17 Two of the four companies are from Israel, one from Kazakhstan, and one from Sweden.  
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protection in various countries.  
We collect Chinese ADRs based on the information from the Bank of New York, 
JPMorgan’s adr.com, CYNE.com, Sina.com, and the historical quarterly Halter USX China 
Index. We read 20-F filings of those ADR firms to identify the location of their headquarters and 
business to ensure that these firms are from China.18 We do not include ADRs traded on the OTC 
because they are exempt from the SEC reporting requirements and not covered in Compustat.19 
These steps result in a sample of 142 U.S.-listed Chinese ADRs in the period 2000-2011.    
In addition to accounting data from Compustat, we obtain the price and return data from 
CRSP, auditing data from Audit Analytics, seasoned equity offerings and private placement data 
from the Thomson SDC New Issues database, and private investment in public equity (PIPE) 
from Sagient Research’s Placement Tracker database.20 We hand-collect CEO turnover and 
corporate governance variables of Chinese RM and ADR firms from 10Ks, 20Fs, and proxy 
statements filed with the SEC.  
Panel A of Table 1 reports the yearly distribution of Chinese RM firms, U.S. RM firms, 
and Chinese ADRs.21 There are more Chinese RM deals in the period 2004-2010. Panel B of 
Table 1 presents the distribution based on the trading venue at the time of data collection. 
NASDAQ is the most popular exchange across the three groups of firms. In comparison, Chinese 
RM firms are more likely to be traded on the major exchanges than U.S. RM firms. Also, a 
disproportionally high percentage of Chinese ADR firms (67 out of 142) are listed on the 
                                                 
18 Eleven firms from the Halter index are not included in our final sample because they are HK firms. Including 
these firms does not affect our results.   
19 Specifically, ADRs (sponsored or unsponsored) traded on the OTC can obtain exemption from Section12g3-2(b) 
of the Security Exchange Act of 1934 registration and Reporting requirements.  
20 The primary difference between PIPEs and traditional private placements is the duration of the resale restrictions 
imposed on the participating investors. Please see Chen et al. (2010) for detailed discussions.   
21 There are 3 Chinese RM firms and 21 Chinese ADR firms that were listed before 2001. Data for U.S. RM firms 
involving shell firms before 2001 are not available from DealFlow Media. Excluding these 24 Chinese firms from 
the sample does not affect the results. 
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NYSE.22 Panel C of Table 1 presents the sample distribution by Fama-French industry 
classification. Most of the U.S.-listed Chinese firms are from the manufacturing, business 
equipment, and healthcare industries. Most of the U.S. RM firms are in the oil and gas, 
healthcare, and business equipment industries.  
To test H1, we need a sample of U.S. IPO firms. As discussed above, prior research finds 
that small firms and poorly performing firms tend to use the RM process to access the capital 
markets. We make two design choices to control for this potential self-selection issue. First, we 
use U.S. IPO firms matched on trading venue, industry, year and size as control firms when 
evaluating the financial reporting quality of Chinese RM and U.S. RM firms.23 Second, as 
discussed below, we include a comprehensive list of variables that prior research shows to affect 
financial reporting quality, including firm size, sales growth, M/B, firm performance, capital 
needs, operating cycle, inventory, as well as industry fixed effects. We believe that our research 
design addresses the potential confounding effect of the differences in firm characteristics 
between RM and IPO firms and the documented results capture the difference in financial 
reporting quality between U.S. RM firms and matched U.S. IPO firms.   
3.2 Measurement of financial reporting quality 
Because there are no universally accepted measures of financial reporting quality, we use a 
wide range of measures to triangulate our results (Dechow et al. 2010). The use of multiple 
measures also helps capture different aspects of financial reporting quality.  
                                                 
22 The results are quantitatively similar when we control for exchange fixed effects in all regressions. 
23 In an untabulated analysis, we use a propensity score method to identify the matched U.S. IPO firms separately 
for U.S. RM firms and Chinese RM firms. Specifically, we identify all U.S. IPO firms that are in the same year and 
exchange as the U.S. RM firms. For each exchange-year, we estimate a Logit regression with the indicator variable 
for U.S. RM firms as the dependent variable and firm size, leverage, market to book ratio, sales growth, capital 
needs, operating cycle, firm performance, and industry indicators as the independent variables. We calculate the 
propensity score for each observation and for each U.S. RM firm, we find the U.S. IPO firm that has the closet 
propensity score (with the maximum difference of 0.001) as the matched U.S. IPO firm. We find matched U.S. IPO 
firms for Chinese RM firms using the same methodology. The inferences from the untabulated tests remain the 
same. 
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The first five measures are accrual-based financial reporting quality measures. The 
following is a brief description, and please see Appendix A for detailed discussion. The first 
measure is the absolute value of discretionary accruals (|DA|) estimated from the Jones model as 
modified in Dechow et al. (1995). The second measure is based on the cross-sectional Dechow 
and Dichev (2002) model, as modified in McNichols (2002), Francis et al. (2005), Ball and 
Shivakumar (2006), and Givoly et al. (2009). The absolute value of the residual from the 
regression (|DD|) is used as a proxy for financial reporting quality. The third measure is the 
absolute value of discretionary revenue (|DR|), the residual estimated from a regression of 
accounts receivable on change in revenue, as developed in McNichols and Stubben (2008) and 
Stubben (2010). The fourth measure is based on the natural logarithm of the ratio of the absolute 
value of accruals to cash flows, ln|ACCR/OCF|, as developed and used in Burgstahler et al. 
(2006) and Hope et al. (2013). Firms may overstate earnings to achieve certain earnings targets 
or to report good performance in specific instances through accrual choices, without affecting 
cash flows. The higher the ratio, the lower the financial reporting quality. The fifth measure is 
the smoothing measure used in man international studies to capture the extent of earnings 
management (e.g., Leuz et al. 2003). It is measured as the standard deviation of net income over 
the standard deviation of operating cash flows. To be consistent with other measures, we 
multiply the ratio by -1 so that the higher the value, the lower the reporting quality.  
We also conduct a principal component analysis to capture the common construct 
underlying the five accrual-based financial reporting quality measures. We define the financial 
reporting index (FRQ) as the first principal component of these five variables. There is only one 
factor with eigenvalue larger than one (2.4) and it explains 48.5% of the sample variance and is 
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positively correlated with each individual measure.24  
Next, we use the model introduced in Ball and Shivakumar (2006) to measure the 
conditional conservatism. This measure has been used in many prior studies (e.g., Hope et al. 
2013). Firms that recognize bad news in a more timely fashion have higher conditional 
conservatism and are usually regarded as of higher financial reporting quality. Specifically, we 
estimate the following model: 
titititititititi
titititititi
CRMNINIDCRMNICRMNID
CRMNINIDNIDNINI
,,1,1,7,1,6,1.5
,41,1,31,21,10, 





	
∆NI is the change in net income scaled by lagged total assets and D∆NI is a dummy variable for 
negative ∆NI. CRM is an indicator variable for Chinese RM firms. While α1 measures the 
persistence of positive change in net income, α3 measures the incremental persistence of negative 
change in net income. Conservative accounting implies α3 to be negative because bad news is 
recognized more timely than good news. If Chinese RM firms are less conservative than the 
control group, α7 is expected to be positive, and vice versa.25 We revise this model accordingly 
when comparing the financial reporting quality of U.S. RM firms and U.S. IPO firms.  
Lastly, we use the probability of accounting restatements as a proxy for financial reporting 
quality. The analysis of restatements complements the analyses based on the above financial 
reporting quality measures. While the above accrual-based measures and the conservatism 
measure are likely to capture earnings management tactics within the GAAP boundaries, 
restatements can capture financial reporting activities beyond such boundaries (DeFond and 
                                                 
24 Because the inclusion of the smoothness measure greatly reduces the sample size, especially for some of the later 
analyses that require additional data, in an untabulated analysis we also generate a common factor from the other 
four individual measures. This factor has an eigenvalue of 2.5 and explains 61.3% of the sample variation. The 
results are quantitatively similar. 
25 Note that we cannot use the Basu (1997) conditional conservatism measure because some of the firms are not 
actively traded and potentially mispriced, leading to noises in stock returns and violating the basic assumption 
underlying the Basu measure that the market is efficient. 
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Jiambalvo 1991; Lang et al. 2006). As such, the results based on restatements may or may not be 
consistent with those based on accrual-based financial reporting quality measures.  
We collect restatements from Audit Analytics, which covers the restatements announced 
since 2000. We include all restatements with available data in the sample. In an untabulated 
additional analysis, we also separate errors from accounting irregularities. To identify accounting 
irregularities, we follow the same procedure as outlined in Hennes et al. (2008) and cross-check 
with the list of fraud cases listed in Siegel and Wang (2013), Ang et al. (2012) and Jindra et al. 
(2012). As a result, 33% of the restatements in our sample are classified as accounting 
irregularities. 
3.3 Descriptive statistics 
Panel D of Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for Chinese RM firms, U.S. RM firms, 
Chinese ADR firms, and the matched U.S. IPO firms, first for financial reporting quality 
measures and then for other variables. Overall, Chinese RM and U.S. RM firms have lower 
financial reporting quality based on the accrual-based measures. Chinese RM firms have a much 
higher likelihood of restatements (18%), compared to U.S. RM firms (7%), Chinese ADR firms 
(4%), and matched U.S. IPO firms (6%).26 Because we do not have firm-year level conditional 
conservatism measure, we report the variables used to capture conservatism. Like Lee et al. 
(2013), we find that Chinese RM firms outperform other firms by having the highest change in 
net income. However, one should interpret this result with caution because it is possible that 
higher reported accounting performance is due to earnings management.  
In terms of the control variables used in the financial reporting quality analysis, we find 
that U.S. RM firms stand out by having the highest market-to-book ratio and sales growth. The 
                                                 
26 The observation that Chinese ADR firms are less likely to have restatements than U.S. IPO firms is consistent 
with the findings in Srinivasan et al. (2012). 
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matched U.S. IPO firms have the highest leverage, although Chinese ADR firms appear to be 
larger. Chinese RM firms have the highest capital needs and matched U.S. IPO firms have the 
lowest capital needs.  
 
4. Financial reporting quality of Chinese RM firms 
In this section, we test hypotheses H1 – H3 by comparing the financial reporting quality of 
various groups of firms. Due to research design differences, we first examine the accrual-based 
measures, and then the conditional conservatism and the likelihood of restatements.  
4.1 Analyses of accrual-based financial reporting quality measures 
Research Design 
We use the following regression model to investigate the financial reporting quality of 
Chinese RM firms relative to the other types of firms: 
ܨܴܳ௜,௧ ൌ
ߙ ൅ ߚܥܴܯ௜,௧ሺܷܴܵܯ௜,௧ሻ ൅ ߛܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧ ൅ ߜܻ݁ܽݎ	ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ ൅ 	ߠܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ	ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ ൅ ߝ௜,௧ (1) 
The dependent variable, FRQ, is one of the following variables: the absolute value of 
discretionary accrual (|DA|), the absolute value of working capital accruals (|DD|), the absolute 
value of discretionary revenue (|DR|), the natural logarithm of the absolute value of the ratio of 
accruals to cash flows (ln|ACCR/CFO|), the smoothing measure (SMOOTH), and the common 
factor. The variable of interest is the indicator variable CRM, which is 1 for Chinese RM firms 
and 0 for the other firms included in the regression. If the financial reporting quality of Chinese 
RM firms is lower than that of the comparison group, then we expect a positive sign for the 
coefficient on CRM. Note that higher variable values imply lower financial reporting quality. 
When comparing the financial reporting quality of U.S. RM firms with U.S. IPO firms, we 
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replace CRM with the indicator variable for U.S. RM firms, USRM, which is 1 for U.S. RM 
firms and 0 for U.S. IPO firms. The reported t-values are based on firm- and year-clustering-
adjusted standard errors.  
Control variables include the variables that prior research suggests affect financial 
reporting quality: the market-to-book ratio (M/B), sales growth (Growth), leverage (LEV), firm 
size (Size), capital needs (Capital_Need), firm performance (ROE, Loss), operating cycle 
(Op_Cycle), and inventory (Inventory).27  Please see Appendix B for the definition of the 
variables. 
Do Chinese RM firms have lower financial reporting quality? 
Before investigating why Chinese RM firms have lower financial reporting quality, we first 
confirm whether they have lower financial reporting quality. For this purpose, we use U.S. IPO 
firms matched with Chinese RM firms on trading venue, industry, year, and size. Table 2 reports 
the regression results based on accrual-based measures. For each of the five individual accrual-
based measures and for the common factor, the coefficient on CRM is positive and significant at 
the 0.05 level or better. Not tabulated for sake of space, the results based on conditional 
conservatism and the likelihood of restatements lead to the same inferences. These results 
confirm that the financial reporting quality of Chinese RM firms is lower than that of matched 
U.S. IPO firms. This finding indicates that the inherent problems with the RM process and/or the 
weak legal enforcement on Chinese firms lead to lower financial reporting quality. 
Test of H1 and H2: The RM factor 
To test H1, we compare the financial reporting quality of U.S. RM firms with the matched 
U.S. IPO firms to investigate whether the RM factor leads to lower financial reporting quality for 
                                                 
27 In an untabulated sensitivity test, we also control for the standard deviation of quarterly earnings and obtain 
qualitatively similar results. 
28 
 
U.S. RM firms. The regression results are reported in Panel A of Table 3. The coefficient on 
USRM is insignificantly different from zero for all of the individual measures and the common 
factor, except for |DR|, for which the coefficient on USRM is marginally significant (t=1.81). 
These results suggest that the less scrutinized RM process does not lead to lower financial 
reporting quality for U.S. RM firms.   
To test H2, we compare the financial reporting quality of Chinese RM firms with Chinese 
ADR firms to investigate whether the RM factor makes a difference, given that both groups of 
firms are subject to weak legal enforcement. Panel B of Table 3 reports the regression results. 
The coefficient on CRM is significantly positive for all of the individual accrual-based measures 
and for the common factor, with the exception of the smoothness measure. This result is 
consistent with H2 that the financial reporting quality of Chinese RM firms is lower than that of 
Chinese ADR firms. Hence, the negative effects of the loopholes associated with RM 
transactions, or the type of firms that RM method attracts, leads to lower financial reporting 
quality. Note that this is a more conservative test because, as discussed above, Chinese RM firms 
are subject to stricter disclosure and reporting requirement on an on-going basis than Chinese 
ADR firms.  
In sum, the results indicate that while the RM factor does not lead to lower financial 
reporting quality for U.S. RM firms, it does for Chinese RM firms.  
Test of H3: The China factor 
Next, we compare Chinese RM and U.S. RM firms. Because both Chinese and U.S. RM 
firms are subject to the same RM-related issues and filing rules, the difference between the two 
groups of firms, if any, would be driven by country-related factors, such as legal enforcement. 
Panel C of Table 3 presents the regression results. The coefficient on CRM is positive across all 
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of the five individual measures and for the common factor, significant at the 0.05 level or better. 
These results are consistent with hypothesis H3 that weak legal enforcement leads to lower 
financial reporting quality of Chinese RM firms. However, one should note that China factor 
alone does not cause the lower financial reporting quality of Chinese RM firms; otherwise, 
Chinese ADR firms would have lower financial reporting quality than U.S. RM firms. 
Untabulated analayses indicate that Chinese ADR firms have similar financial reporting quality 
as U.S. RM firms. 
4.2 Conditional conservatism 
Table 4 reports the results from the conditional conservatism analysis. Again, if U.S. RM 
firms or Chinese RM firms are less conservative than others included in the regression, we would 
expect a positive coefficient on the three way interaction term. In Column (1) we compare the 
conditional conservatism between U.S. RM and U.S. IPO firms and we find that the two groups 
of firms are not different from each other (t=0.04). In Column (2), we compare Chinese RM and 
Chinese ADR firms and we find that Chinese RM firms are less conservative than Chinese ADR 
firms (t=2.10). In the last column, we compare Chinese RM and U.S. RM firms and we find that 
Chinese RM firms are less conservative than U.S. RM firms (t=2.03). These results are 
consistent with those based on accrual-based financial reporting quality measures.  
4.3 The probability of restatements 
To test whether Chinese RM (or U.S. RM) firms differ from other types of firms regarding 
the probability of restatements, we estimate the following Logit regression: 
             (2) 
The dependent variable, Restatement, is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the financial statement 
of the firm in that year is restated later, and 0 otherwise. We include the same set of control 
Pr(Restatementit )  1CRM it (orUSRM it )Controlsit-1
Year Dummies IndustryDummiesit
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variables as in Equation (1). 
Table 5 reports the results of three models: Model (1) comparing U.S. RM firms with 
matched U.S. IPO firms, Model (2) comparing Chinese RM firms and Chinese ADR firms, and 
Model (3) comparing Chinese and U.S. RM firms. As reported in Model (1), we find that U.S. 
RM firms and U.S. IPO firms do not differ from each other (t=-0.17). As reported in models (2) 
and (3), the coefficient on the indicator for Chinese RM firms, CRM, is significantly positive 
(t=5.79 and 7.75, respectively), indicating that Chinese RM firms exhibit a higher likelihood of 
restatements than Chinese ADR firms and U.S. RM firms. The marginal effect is also 
economically significant. A shift from Chinese ADR firms to Chinese RM firms increases the 
probability of restatements by 7.48 percentage points and a shift from U.S. RM to Chinese RM 
firms increases the probability by 17.52 percentage points (untabulated). The inferences are the 
same when we separate irregularities from errors in an untabulated analysis. 
In sum, the results from the analysis of the likelihood of restatements are consistent with 
those based on accrual-based financial reporting quality measures and conditional conservatism. 
 
5. Why do Chinese RM firms have lower financial reporting quality?  
The results reported above indicate that Chinese RM firms have inferior financial reporting 
quality than other firms, and this is due to the combination of RM and China factor. The RM 
process itself does not seem to lead to poor financial reporting quality because U.S. RM firms 
have similar financial reporting quality as U.S. IPO firms. The China factor alone does not 
explain the results, either. Otherwise, Chinese RM firms should not have lower financial 
reporting quality than Chinese ADR firms. These results suggest that Chinese RM firms have 
weaker bonding incentives and the cheap, fast, and less scrutinized RM process provides these 
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Chinese firms with means to access to the U. S. capital markets, as hypothesized in H4a and 
H4b. In this section, we first use the methodology used in prior research to investigate whether 
bonding incentives are lower for Chinese RM firms than for Chinese ADR firms, and then 
examine whether Chinese RM firms have poorer corporate governance than Chinese ADRs.  
5.1 Test of H4a: Is the bonding incentive weaker for Chinese RM firms? 
Lel and Miller (2008) argue that if a foreign firm has a weaker bonding incentive, then its 
CEO turnover is less sensitive to firm performance. It thus follows that if Chinese RM firms 
have weaker bonding incentives, then Chinese RM firms should have lower CEO turnover-
performance sensitivity than Chinese ADR firms. Following Lel and Miller (2008), we use the 
following regression model to test this prediction:  
 (3) 
CEO_Turnoverit is a binary variable that equals 1 if the CEO is replaced in year t. Following Lel 
and Miller (2008) and other prior studies on CEO turnover, we use two measures to capture firm 
performance. The first one is ROA, measured as earnings before interest and taxes divided by 
total assets, and the second one is industry-adjusted stock returns. We use the lagged 
performance measure to avoid overlapping the replaced CEO’s performance with the new 
CEO’s. Because CEO-turnover performance sensitivity is negative, we expect a positive 
coefficient on the interaction term if Chinese RM firms have weaker bonding incentives. We 
control for firm size, industry, and year fixed effects, as in Lel and Miller (2008), as well as the 
control variables included in Equation (1) to be consistent with the financial reporting quality 
analysis, with the exception of ROE. ROE is not included as a control because of the inclusion of 
the performance measure (PER) in the model.  
We hand collect CEO turnover data from the financial statements filed by U.S.-listed 
itti,
itii1-t i,it
DummiesIndustryDummiesYearControls
CRMPERCRMPERTurnoverCEO



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Chinese firms and the Audit Analytics database. Untabulated analyses indicate that the CEO 
turnover ratio is 9.13% for Chinese RM firms and 15.87% for Chinese ADR firms, and the 
difference is significant at the 0.01 level. 
Table 6 presents the regression results. As in Lel and Miller (2008), the probability of CEO 
turnover is negatively correlated with firm performance (t=-3.05 and -22.66, respectively). More 
importantly, the probability of CEO turnover is less sensitive to firm performance for Chinese 
RM firms than for Chinese ADR firms. The coefficient on PER×CRM is significantly positive at 
the 0.05 level (t=2.99 and 2.05, respectively).28 This result is consistent with H4a, indicating that 
Chinese RM firms have weaker bonding incentives, i.e., lower incentives to improve corporate 
governance to signal their intention to protect minority shareholder rights.  
5.2 Test of H4b: Corporate governance of Chinese RM firms vs. Chinese ADR firms 
In this section, we test H4b by examining whether the RM process attracts Chinese firms 
with weak bonding incentives, as exemplified in the corporate governance features. We first 
investigate the differences in several common corporate governance features – ownership 
structure, board characteristics, and CEO compensation structure – between Chinese RM firms 
and Chinese ADR firms. We then examine to what extent these differences lead to differential 
financial reporting quality.  
We hand collect all of the required information from 10-Ks, 20-Fs, and proxy statements 
filed by Chinese firms during the sample period, including insider ownership (holdings by the 
officers and directors), existence of foreigner blockholders (non-Chinese owners with 10% of 
ownership or higher), board characteristics (board size, board independence, whether the CEO is 
the chairman), whether the CEO is the founder of the firm, and CEO compensation 
                                                 
28 An F-test indicates the net turnover-performance sensitivity for Chinese RM firms (PER + PER × CRM) is 
insignificantly different from zero (p=0.614 and 0.875, respectively).  
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characteristics (whether firms grant CEOs options).29 Panel A of Table 7 reports the 
characteristics of these variables separately for Chinese RM firms and Chinese ADR firms and 
then p-values based on the t-test and Z-test for the differences in means and medians, 
respectively. We find that compared to Chinese ADR firms, Chinese RM firms have higher 
insider ownership, fewer large foreign blockholders, smaller and less independent boards, higher 
likelihood of having the CEO as the chairman, and are less likely to have founder CEOs or to 
grant the CEO option-based compensation. Overall, the results are consistent with H4b that the 
strength of corporate governance is weaker in Chinese RM firms than in Chinese ADR firms.  
Next, we examine whether differences in corporate governance features lead to differential 
financial reporting quality with a two-stage process. In the first stage, we use the above 
governance characteristics to predict the probability of a Chinese firm being a Chinese RM firm, 
that is, the CRM dummy (equal to 1 for Chinese RM firms and 0 for Chinese ADR firms). The 
overall explanatory power of the model, as measured by the Pseudo R2, is 35.5%. In the second 
stage, we rely on the predicted value of CRM (CRM_P) and the residual (CRM_R) generated 
from the first stage model to explain the financial reporting quality of U.S.-listed Chinese firms: 
ititititit ControlsCRM_RCRM_PFRQ   21                     (4) 
The dependent variable, FRQ, is the common factor generated from the individual accrual-based 
measures. If the weak corporate governance of Chinese RM firms leads to lower financial 
reporting quality, then CRM_P should be negatively correlated with financial reporting quality, 
resulting in a positive coefficient on CRM_P. The coefficient on the residual value of CRM 
(CRM_R) captures the impact of other unidentified differences between Chinese RM firms and 
non-RM Chinese firms on financial reporting quality.  
                                                 
29 Leuz et al. (2003) argue that higher insider ownership weakens, and Siegel (2005) argues that having a large 
foreign shareholder can improve, the governance of the firm.  
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Panel B of Table 7 reports the regression results. Because the sample size is smaller due to 
additional data requirements, we first replicate the analyses reported in Panel B of Table 3 in 
Column (1) and obtain quantitatively similar results. Column (2) reports the results from 
Equation (4). The coefficient on CRM_P is positive and significant (t=3.09). This result indicates 
that the corporate governance decisions made by Chinese firms are strongly correlated with 
financial reporting quality; that is, poor corporate governance leads to lower financial reporting 
quality of Chinese RM firms. The coefficients on the residual (CRM_R) are also positive and 
significant at the 0.05 level, although the coefficient is smaller than that on CRM_P.30 In 
untabulated analyses, we also examine how CRM_P is related to conditional conservatism and 
the probability of restatements. The inferences are the same.  
In sum, the results in this section are consistent with the notion that compared to Chinese 
ADR firms, Chinese RM firms have weaker bonding incentives and are unwilling to improve 
their corporate governance to signal their intention to protect shareholder rights. These factors 
are strongly correlated with firms’ decision to choose the RM approach to access the U.S. capital 
markets, and partially explain their lower financial reporting quality. 
5.3 Cross-sectional analysis within Chinese RM firms  
In this section, we explore the cross-sectional differences within Chinese RM firms to 
further enhance our understanding of the factors and incentives that contribute to or mitigate 
their inferior financial reporting quality. Specifically, we examine the influence of corporate 
governance, auditor choice, financing incentives, and the IPO qualification in China on these 
firms’ financial reporting quality.31  
                                                 
30 An untabulated F-test indicates that the coefficient on CRM_P is significantly larger than that on CRM_R. The p-
value of the F-test is 0.02. Note that our focus is the coefficient on CRM_P, not the coefficient on CRM_R or the 
difference between CRM_P and CRM_R. 
31 Due to the small sample size, we cannot carry out analyses of conditional conservatism and restatements.  
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Following the discussion in Section 5.2, we expect Chinese RM firms with stronger 
governance to have better financial reporting quality than those with weaker governance. To test 
this conjecture, we generate a common factor based on the governance variables used in Panel A 
of Table 7 and refer to it as Governance: the higher the value, the stronger the corporate 
governance. This common factor has an eigenvalue of 1.91. Based on the aggregate financial 
reporting quality measure, the result reported in Model (1) of Table 8 suggests that Chinese RM 
firms with stronger corporate governance exhibit better financial reporting quality. 
The quality of audit work in many Chinese RM cases has been questioned. Some 
fraudulent cases arise from the auditors’ failure to understand worksheets written in Chinese and 
to validate some of the legal documents, such as deposit certifications (Gillis 2011b). Therefore, 
it is argued that the auditors may lack the resources or expertise and/or rely too much on other 
people’s work (PCAOB 2010). While such concerns apply to both Big4 auditors and smaller 
audit firms, previous studies show that reputational concerns and resources available to large 
audit firms enable them to do a better job than small ones (Becker et al. 1998; Francis et al. 
1999). This belief is also shared by RM consulting firms, some of which claim that they “would 
not do an RM unless the company agreed to a Top Ten auditor (Lawrence 2011),” and the SEC, 
which states that “small U.S. auditing firms … may not have the resources to meet its auditing 
obligations when all or substantially all of … operations are in another country. As a result, such 
auditing firms might not identify circumstances where these companies may not be complying 
with the relevant standards (SEC 2011).” In addition, auditors are subject to litigation risk if 
Chinese RM firms are discovered to engage in accounting frauds (Templin 2012) and the risk is 
usually higher for large auditors. As such, we conjecture that big auditing firms provide higher 
quality audit work and enhance the financial reporting quality. Around 11% of the Chinese RM 
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firms have Big4 auditors. The result reported in Model (2) of Table 8 indicates that Chinese RM 
firms hiring Big 4 auditors exhibit better financial reporting quality than others.32  
Next, we test whether issuing shares in the U.S. affect the financial reporting quality of 
Chinese RM firms. A significant benefit of listing in the U.S. is the access to cheaper capital 
(Coffee 1999, 2002; Stulz 1999). Prior research finds that firms manipulate earnings around the 
period of equity issuance (e.g., Teoh et al. 1998). It thus follows that the Chinese RM firms that 
raise capital after the RM transactions are more likely to engage in earnings management, 
leading to lower financial reporting quality, than other Chinese RM firms. We construct an 
indicator variable (EquityIssue) for the existence of share issuance. Around 13.5% of our sample 
Chinese RM firms have equity issuance in the future. As reported in Model (3) of Table 8, the 
coefficient on EquityIssue is positive and significant at the 0.01 level, indicating that Chinese 
RM firms issuing shares have lower financial reporting quality than other Chinese RM firms. 
Note that this result contrasts the finding in Ndubizu (2007) that raising equity capital does not 
affect foreign firms’ financial reporting quality when RM firms are not included in the sample. 
Finally, we examine whether the financial reporting quality differs between Chinese RM 
firms that qualify to list on Chinese exchanges and those that do not qualify.33 Compared to those 
non-qualified, firms that qualify to list on the Chinese stock exchanges likely choose to come to 
the U.S. for different reasons. Those seeking to bond to the stringent U.S. rules may choose to 
cross-list their stocks or pursue the IPO method, which is a more costly but credible signal of 
their incentives. If qualified firms choose to access the U.S. market via RMs, their intention is 
probably to avoid the more stringent rules and just “rent” the reputation of being a U.S. public 
                                                 
32 We also construct dummies to indicate Big4 auditors that are China experts or RM experts (having 10 or more 
Chinese firm clients or RM firm clients) and we find qualitatively similar results. 
33 The current listing criteria in China include: (1) net income being positive in the two consecutive years before IPO, 
(2) net assets being larger than RMB20 million, and (3) the sum of net income in the two years before listing being 
greater than a specified level. 
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firm. In contrast, firms that are not qualified to be listed on Chinese stock exchanges cannot 
obtain the approval from the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) to list their 
shares in China and the U.S., and thus have no other choices but to adopt the RM approach to 
obtain the access to the U.S. capital markets. Their objective is prone to obtain funding to 
support their growth. As such, they have stronger bonding incentives and are less likely to 
engage in earnings management, leading to better financial reporting quality. Around 26% of our 
sample Chinese RM firms are qualified to be listed on Chinese stock exchanges. Consistent with 
this argument, as reported in Model (4) of Table 8, we find that qualified Chinese RM firms have 
poorer financial reporting quality than those that do not qualify.34 
In sum, the results reported in Table 8 indicate that having better governance and hiring 
Big 4 auditors lead to better financial reporting quality. Firms that obtain equity financing or are 
qualified to be listed in China, however, exhibit inferior financial reporting quality.  
 
6. Market’s perception of Chinese RM firms’ financial reporting quality 
The results so far indicate that Chinese RM firms have lower financial reporting quality 
due to the combination of the RM factor and China factor. It is natural to wonder whether the 
markets recognize Chinese RM firms’ low financial reporting quality and if not, whether the low 
financial reporting quality of Chinese RM firms is linked to the firms’ future stock returns. We 
explore these issues in this section. 
Earnings response coefficient (ERC) is commonly used to capture the capital markets’ 
perception of financial reporting quality (e.g., Wilson 2008; Chen et al. 2013). In this section, we 
                                                 
34 In a similar vein, we find that Chinese RM firms located in better-developed provinces/regions (e.g., Beijing, 
Shanghai, Guangdong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang) have lower financial reporting quality than other Chinese RM firms. One 
possible reason is that Chinese RM firms located in better-developed provinces/regions have more funding 
opportunities and thus lower bonding incentives in terms of obtaining funding from the U.S. capital markets, leading 
to lower financial reporting quality.  
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examine whether the ERC differs between Chinese RM firms and other firms. Table 9 reports the 
results. The results indicate that Chinese RM firms have similar ERC as matched U.S. IPO firms, 
Chinese ADR firms, and U.S. RM firms. The results remain the same if we control for additional 
control variables and their impact on the ERC. This result indicates that the market does not 
recognize low financial reporting quality of Chinese RM firms at the time when earnings are 
announced. This result is not surprising given the later downfall of many Chinese RM firms. Had 
the market correctly understood the financial reporting quality of Chinese RM firms, the price 
would have reflected the poor financial reporting quality of Chinese RM firms. (The logic is very 
similar to that found in the literature on accounting restatements, which observes that investors 
did not correctly evaluate the financial reporting quality during the restated period and punished 
the firms after restatement announcements.)  
The next question is that if the market fails to recognize the lower financial reporting 
quality of Chinese RM firms when earnings are announced, then does the market gradually 
recognize the issue in the future and price the shares accordingly? That is, are future stock 
returns correlated with current financial reporting quality? We answer this question by regressing 
future stock returns on current financial reporting quality for Chinese RM firms and report the 
results in Table 10. Specifically, we separate Chinese RM firms into two groups based on the 
aggregate financial reporting quality measure (FRQ). FRQ_LOW is an indicator for the Chinese 
RM firms that have FRQ lower than the sample median. As reported in the table, we find that the 
coefficient on FRQ_LOW is significantly negative when the stock return is estimated over the 
next year, the next two years, and the next three years (t=-1.71, -2.16, -2.06, respectively). The 
economic magnitude is also significant: compared to firms with high financial reporting quality, 
those with low financial reporting quality experience a lower stock returns, 26.5, 55.0, and 61.2 
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percentage points in one year, two years, and three years, respectively.  
Overall, the results in this section indicate that the market fails to recognize the low 
financial reporting quality of Chinese RM firms, and this failure is related to the observed overall 
market correction for Chinese RM firms. Within Chinese RM firms, we find that those with 
lower financial reporting quality experience a significantly lower stock return in the future.  
 
7. Conclusion 
In this study, we find that Chinese reverse merger (RM) firms have lower financial 
reporting quality, have lower extent of conditional conservatism, and are more likely to restate 
their earnings than matched U.S. IPO firms, U.S. RM firms, or Chinese ADR firms. On the other 
hand, we do not find any difference in financial reporting quality between U.S. RM firms and 
matched U.S. IPO firms. The results indicate that the lower financial reporting quality of Chinese 
RM firms results from the joint effect of the less scrutinized RM process and the weak legal 
enforcement over Chinese firms. Additional analyses indicate that Chinese firms with weak 
bonding incentives choose the RM approach. Compared with Chinese ADR firms, Chinese RM 
firms have lower CEO turnover-performance sensitivity (a measure of the strength of the 
bonding incentive) and exhibit poorer corporate governance, which partly explain their low 
financial reporting quality. 
This study extends the literature by shedding light on why Chinese RM firms have lower 
financial reporting quality. We find that the RM process provides Chinese firms with low 
bonding incentives and poor governance the opportunity to access the U.S. capital market, 
resulting in poor financial reporting quality in Chinese RM firms. In addition, we find that 
having strong governance and hiring Big 4 auditors improve Chinese RM firms’ financial 
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reporting quality. These results should be of interest to regulators who are contemplating the 
rules related to RMs, and to investors who trade these firms’ shares. 
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Appendix A 
 Measurement of individual accrual-based financial reporting quality variables 
 
This appendix describes the detailed measurement of the five individual accrual-based 
financial reporting quality measures used in this study.  
 
Our first measure is the absolute value of discretionary accruals. Discretionary accruals are 
estimated from the modified Jones model, as in Dechow et al. (1995). Specifically, we estimate 
the following regression model: 
titi
ti
ti PPERECREVTA
ACCR ,,3ti,ti,2
,
1, )()
1(  
, 
where ACCR is total accruals calculated as the difference between income before extraordinary 
items and operating cash flows, TA is total assets at the beginning of the year, ΔREV is the 
change in sales, ΔREC is the change in accounts receivable, and PPE is gross property, plant, 
and equipment. In the above equation, all of the variables are scaled by TA. The above regression 
model is estimated by industry-year using all firm-year observations (industries being defined 
based on two-digit SIC codes). The regression residual is discretionary accruals (DA). We use 
the absolute value of DA (|DA|) as our first measure of financial reporting quality. 
 
Our second measure is based on a modified version of the cross-sectional Dechow-Dichev 
(2002) model. The Dechow-Dichev model focuses on the strength of the relation between current 
accruals and past, present, and future cash flows. In particular, we use the Dechow-Dichev model 
as modified by McNichols (2002) and Francis et al. (2005), adjusting for negative cash flows 
(Ball and Shivakumar 2006; Givoly et al. 2009). Specifically, we estimate the following model 
for each industry-year that has at least 20 observations: 
tititii,tti
tititi
DOCFOCFDOCFPPE
ΔREVOCFOCFWCA
,,,76,5
,41,3ti,21-ti,10, OCF



 
, 
where WCA is working capital accruals, measured as the change in non-cash current assets minus 
the change in current liabilities (other than short-term debt and taxes payable), scaled by lagged 
total assets; OCF is operating cash flows, measured as the sum of net income, depreciation, and 
amortization, minus WCA, scaled by lagged total assets; ΔREV and PPE are defined as above; 
and DOCF is an indicator variable for negative operating cash flows. The residual from the 
above equation represents the component in the current accruals that are not associated with 
operating cash flows and that cannot be explained by the change in revenue or the level of PPE. 
We use the absolute value of this residual (|DD|) as a proxy for financial reporting quality. 
 
Our third measure is the absolute value of discretionary revenues based on McNichols and 
Stubben (2008) and Stubben (2010). Specifically, we estimate the following regression for each 
industry-year that has at least 20 observations: 
titi REVAR ,ti,10,   , 
where ΔAR represents the annual change in accounts receivable scaled by lagged total assets, and 
ΔREV is as defined above. Discretionary revenue (DR) is the residual from this regression and its 
absolute value, |DR|, is used as a proxy for financial reporting quality. 
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Our fourth measure is based on the ratio of the absolute value of accruals to cash flows 
(Burgstahler et al. 2006; Hope et al. 2013). Firms may overstate earnings to achieve certain 
targets or to report good performance in specific instances, such as equity issuance (Teoh et al. 
1998). Similarly, in years with poor performance, firms may boost their earnings using reserves 
or engage in aggressive accounting practices. Earnings can be temporarily inflated due to accrual 
choices, but cash flows remain unaffected. In such cases, the higher the ratio, the lower the 
financial reporting quality. To avoid the effect of extreme values, we use the log transformation 
of this ratio as our fourth proxy, ln|ACCR/OCF|.  
 
The fifth measure, SMOOTH, is the smoothing measure used in some international studies 
to capture the extent of earnings management (e.g., Leuz et al. 2003). It is measured as the 
standard deviation of net income over the standard deviation of operating cash flows. To be 
consistent with other measures, we multiply the ratio by -1 so that the higher the value, the lower 
the reporting quality.  
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Appendix B 
Variable definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
Dependent variables 
 |DA| Absolute value of discretionary accruals, as described in Appendix A; 
|DD| Absolute value of discretionary working capital accrual, as described in Appendix A; 
|DR| Absolute value of discretionary revenue, as described in Appendix A;  
ln|ACCR/OCF| The natural logarithm of the ratio of the absolute value of total accruals to operating 
cash flows, as described in Appendix A; 
SMOOTH The ratio of standard deviation of net income over the standard deviation of 
operating cash flows, multiplied by -1, as described in Appendix A; 
FRQ The financial reporting quality index, measured as the common factor from the 
principal component analysis of the five individual measures: |DA|, |DD|, |DR|, 
ln|ACCR/OCF|, and SMOOTH; 
Independent variables 
CRM Chinese RM firm dummy, equal to 1 if the firm is a Chinese RM firm, and 0 
otherwise; 
USRM U.S. RM firm dummy, equal to 1 if the firm is a U.S. RM firm, and 0 otherwise; 
M/B The market-to-book ratio, calculated as market value of equity divided by book value 
of equity;  
Growth Sales growth, measured as the percentage change in sales; 
LEV The leverage ratio, measured as total debt divided by total assets; 
ROE Return-on-equity, measured as income before extra-ordinary items divided by 
shareholders’ equity;  
Size Size of the firm, measured as the natural logarithm of total assets; 
Capital_need The percentage change in common stock, preferred stock, and long-term debt in the 
following year; 
Loss The cumulative percentage of sample years that the firm reported a loss during the 
sample period; 
Op_Cycle Operating cycle of the firm, measured as Inventory/Cost of Sales + 
Receivables/Sales; 
Inventory Inventory divided by total assets. 
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive statistics of Chinese reverse merger (RM) firms, U.S. RM firms, and Chinese 
ADR firms 
Panel A: Sample distribution by the year of listing  
 
The table reports the distribution of sample firms based on the year when their shares were first listed in 
the U.S stock markets.  
 
First Listing Year  Chinese RM firms   U.S. RM firms  Chinese ADR firms  
2000 and earlier  3  0  21 
2001  1  3  5 
2002  0  12  1 
2003  7  17  0 
2004  16  49  8 
2005  24  48  7 
2006  39  38  11 
2007  31  36  20 
2008  31  26  14 
2009  15  15  13 
2010  18  17  26 
2011  8  12  16 
 
Total  193  273  142 
 
Panel B: Distribution of firms by exchanges at the time of data collection 
Firm Type  NYSE  NASDAQ  AMEX  
 
OTC  Total 
 
Chinese RM firms   6  82  28  77  193 
U.S. RM firms  4  39  22  208  273 
Chinese ADR firms   67  74  1  0  142 
 
Total  77  195  51  
 
285   
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TABLE 1 (cont’d) 
Panel C: Sample distribution by Fama-French industry classification 
 
Industry  
Chinese 
RM firms  
Chinese non-
RM firms   
U.S. 
RM firms 
Consumer Non-Durables  23  8  12 
Consumer Durables  10  3  8 
Manufacturing  38  9  23 
Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction and Products  5  5  27 
Chemicals and Allied Products  13  4  9 
Business Equipment  31  58  58 
Telephone and Television Transmission  3  6  7 
Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services   22  8  15 
Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drugs  23  11  54 
Others  25  30  60 
 
Total   193  142  273 
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TABLE 1 (cont’d) 
 
Panel D: Descriptive statistics on financial reporting quality and control variables 
 Chinese RM firms  
U.S. IPO firms 
matched with 
Chinese RM firms 
 U.S. RM firms  
U.S. IPO firms 
matched with U.S. 
RM firms 
 Chinese ADR firms  
 mean median  mean median  mean median  mean median  mean median  
Dependent variables 
|DA| 0.17 0.12  0.12 0.07  0.22 0.13  0.17 0.09  0.10 0.06 
|DD| 0.18 0.13  0.05 0.02  0.13 0.07  0.08 0.04  0.09 0.05 
|DR| 0.12 0.07  0.05 0.02  0.10 0.04  0.07 0.03  0.06 0.03 
ln|ACCR/OCF| -0.44 -0.29  -0.49 -0.46  -0.54 -0.57  -0.53 -0.48  -0.45 -0.44 
SMOOTH -2.06 -0.87  -2.45 -1.00  -2.14 -0.97  -2.66 -1.13  -2.37 -0.87 
FRQ 0.68 0.33  -0.10 -0.29  0.42 0.11  0.24 -0.02  -0.38 -0.58 
Restatement 0.18 0.00  0.06 0.00  0.07 0.00  0.06 0.00  0.04 0.00 
ΔNIt 0.03 0.03  0.00 0.00  -0.03 -0.02  0.00 0.00  0.03 0.02 
ΔNIt-1 0.02 0.03  -0.02 0.00  -0.08 -0.28  -0.03 0.00  0.02 0.02 
DΔNIt 0.33 0.00  0.40 0.00  0.56 1.00  0.47 0.00  0.32 0.00 
Control variables 
MB 2.99 1.40  3.56 1.50  5.90 3.79  4.52 2.33  2.56 1.58 
Growth (%) 38.31 26.49  18.37 0.00  51.21 24.78  26.84 0.00  38.63 27.13 
LEV (%) 14.03 8.11  16.99 9.72  13.94 3.67  12.98 5.15  13.55 5.59 
ROE (%) 6.17 15.86  -5.49 0.50  -19.51 -36.21  -13.56 -18.28  8.34 10.27 
Size 4.29 4.44  4.26 4.27  2.99 2.94  2.91 2.83  6.51 6.04 
Capital_need (%) 19.21 0.00  4.66 0.00  9.46 0.00  6.83 0.00  9.59 0.02 
Loss (%) 13.91 0.00  43.44 40.00  35.70 33.33  49.27 45.45  12.92 0.00 
Op_cycle 0.66 0.46  0.56 0.32  0.81 0.25  0.71 0.28  0.43 0.29 
Inventory 0.10 0.06  0.14 0.11  0.08 0.002  0.08 0.01  0.06 0.02 
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TABLE 2 
Financial reporting quality of Chinese RM firms vs. matched U.S. IPO firms 
 
This table reports the results from regressing the financial reporting quality measures on the Chinese RM 
firms and control variables: 
ܨܴܳ௜,௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚܥܴܯ௜,௧ ൅ ߛܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧ ൅ ߜܻ݁ܽݎ	ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ ൅ 	ߠܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ	ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ ൅ ߝ௜,௧ 
CRM is 1 for Chinese RM firms and 0 for matched U.S. IPO firms. The table reports the coefficient 
estimates, t-values based on standard errors adjusted for firm- and year-level clustering (in brackets), the 
number of observations, and the adjusted R2. All of the variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% 
levels. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-
tailed t-test). Please see Appendix B for variable definitions. 
 
 |DA| |DD| |DR| ln|ACCR/OCF| SMOOTH FRQ 
CRM 0.053*** 0.086*** 0.057*** 0.749*** 0.013** 0.575*** 
 (4.09) (6.99) (3.91) (4.52) (2.00) (4.94) 
M/B 0.000 0.000 -0.002** -0.023* 0.003** 0.007 
 (0.24) (0.21) (-2.13) (-1.90) (2.41) (0.82) 
Growth 0.063*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.245*** 0.005 0.373*** 
 (7.96) (4.36) (3.55) (3.13) (1.03) (3.72) 
LEV -0.025 0.015 0.057** -0.028 -0.026 0.406* 
 (-1.41) (0.52) (2.20) (-0.07) (-1.43) (1.69) 
ROE -0.068*** 0.023*** 0.026*** -0.416** 0.128*** 0.029 
 (-4.26) (4.87) (4.20) (-2.16) (6.26) (0.42) 
Size -0.018*** -0.006* -0.011* -0.967*** -0.016* -0.198*** 
 (-3.80) (-1.74) (-1.88) (-18.16) (-1.96) (-5.13) 
Capital_need -0.000* 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001* 
 (-1.65) (0.13) (-1.37) (0.24) (0.56) (-1.71) 
Loss -0.005*** -0.001 -0.004** 0.039 -0.007*** -0.004 
 (-3.92) (-0.90) (-2.54) (1.46) (-2.83) (-0.47) 
Op_cycle -0.000 0.000 0.000*** -0.000** 0.000** 0.000 
 (-0.65) (1.55) (3.35) (-1.97) (1.97) (0.32) 
Inventory -0.001 -0.011 -0.060 0.858* 0.058 -0.198 
 (-0.02) (-0.51) (-1.20) (1.88) (1.21) (-0.55) 
Intercept 0.168*** 0.033 0.018 -1.306 -0.981*** 0.597* 
 (4.49) (0.74) (0.60) (-1.34) (-25.34) (1.80) 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 636 616 652 658 450 412 
Adjusted R2 32.5% 29.5% 26.3% 39.2% 45.6% 34.4% 
  
52 
 
TABLE 3 
Comparison of financial reporting quality among different types of firms 
 
This table reports the results from regressing the financial reporting quality measures on the firm type 
dummy variable and control variables: 
 
ܨܴܳ௜,௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚܥܴܯ௜,௧ሺܷܴܵܯ௜,௧ሻ ൅ ߛܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧ ൅ ߜܻ݁ܽݎ	ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ ൅ 	ߠܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ	ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ ൅ ߝ௜,௧ 
 
The table reports the coefficient estimates, t-values based on standard errors adjusted for firm- and year-
level clustering (in brackets), the number of observations, and the adjusted R2. All of the variables are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively (two-tailed t-test). Please see Appendix B for variable definitions. 
 
Panel A: Financial reporting quality of U.S. RM firms vs. U.S. IPO firms matched on industry, 
exchange, year, and size 
 
 |DA| |DD| |DR| ln|ACCR/OCF| SMOOTH FRQ 
USRM 0.012 0.010 0.016* 0.072 -0.003 0.132 
 (0.88) (0.96) (1.81) (0.98) (-0.36) (1.20) 
M/B 0.000 0.001 0.001* -0.029*** 0.001 -0.003 
 (0.70) (1.19) (1.82) (-3.54) (1.26) (-0.31) 
Growth 0.044*** 0.013*** 0.011 0.190*** -0.002 0.071*** 
 (5.34) (3.11) (1.54) (6.42) (-0.53) (24.37) 
LEV -0.029 -0.047 -0.031 1.163 -0.073 -0.341 
 (-0.35) (-1.62) (-1.58) (1.60) (-1.64) (-0.71) 
ROE -0.064*** -0.012 0.002 -0.179** 0.052*** -0.383** 
 (-3.20) (-0.87) (0.35) (-2.04) (5.40) (-2.46) 
Size -0.004 -0.009* -0.003 -0.926*** -0.023*** -0.132*** 
 (-0.63) (-1.91) (-1.33) (-16.99) (-4.44) (-3.04) 
Capital_need 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.44) (0.74) (0.33) (0.64) (-0.32) (0.18) 
Loss -0.007*** -0.005*** -0.001 0.001 -0.003 -0.032* 
 (-4.86) (-4.33) (-0.66) (0.04) (-1.63) (-1.68) 
Op_cycle 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.35) (-0.74) (-0.67) (-3.13) (-0.24) (-0.33) 
Inventory 0.006 0.147** 0.120 -1.082 0.047 0.542 
 (0.12) (2.41) (1.51) (-1.29) (1.43) (0.81) 
Intercept 0.116*** 0.166* 0.074 0.267 -0.956*** 0.646* 
 (2.91) (1.93) (1.55) (0.58) (-60.10) (1.78) 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 412 372 430 430 372 320 
Adjusted R2 22.9% 15.1% 17.5% 44.2% 29.0% 18.9% 
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TABLE 3 (cont’d) 
 
Panel B: Financial reporting quality of Chinese RM firms vs. Chinese ADR firms 
 
 |DA| |DD| |DR| ln|ACCR/OCF| SMOOTH FRQ 
CRM 0.028*** 0.023** 0.029*** 0.243* 0.041 0.242*** 
 (3.11) (2.25) (2.69) (1.87) (0.89) (3.09) 
M/B 0.000 0.001* -0.001 -0.022** 0.004 -0.005 
 (0.18) (1.68) (-1.37) (-2.34) (0.46) (-0.66) 
Growth 0.078*** 0.052*** 0.048*** 0.312*** 0.047*** 0.418*** 
 (10.99) (9.89) (5.52) (4.49) (3.35) (5.86) 
LEV -0.006 0.032 0.040 0.832*** -0.573 0.468** 
 (-0.24) (1.32) (1.54) (4.34) (-1.59) (2.20) 
ROE -0.047*** -0.002 0.024 -0.585*** 0.287*** 0.005 
 (-4.54) (-0.41) (1.28) (-4.74) (3.02) (0.05) 
Size -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.011*** -1.037*** -0.010 -0.188*** 
 (-4.14) (-3.08) (-3.97) (-33.83) (-0.43) (-8.47) 
Capital_need 0.000 -0.000 -0.000* -0.001* 0.000** -0.000 
 (0.66) (-1.43) (-1.81) (-1.71) (2.47) (-0.57) 
Loss -0.009*** -0.004 -0.007** 0.030 0.008 -0.023 
 (-3.15) (-1.49) (-2.58) (1.07) (0.39) (-1.00) 
Op_cycle 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000* 0.000* 0.000 0.000** 
 (7.79) (7.30) (1.68) (1.92) (1.48) (2.43) 
Inventory 0.168** 0.105*** -0.048 1.034** -0.160 0.783** 
 (2.42) (3.12) (-0.89) (1.98) (-0.74) (2.32) 
Intercept 0.030 0.091*** 0.094*** -1.026*** -1.199*** 0.259 
 (1.29) (3.69) (3.08) (-3.33) (-8.05) (1.41) 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1008 983 1016 1018 902 866 
Adjusted R2 43.5% 38.3% 25.7% 76.1% 7.6% 47.2% 
 
  
54 
 
TABLE 3 (cont’d) 
 
Panel C: Financial reporting quality of Chinese RM firms vs. U.S. RM firms 
 
 |DA| |DD| |DR| ln|ACCR/OCF| SMOOTH FRQ 
CRM 0.027** 0.047*** 0.035*** 0.283** 0.038*** 0.329*** 
 (2.34) (3.08) (3.31) (2.02) (3.24) (2.79) 
M/B -0.001** 0.001 0.001 -0.032*** 0.001* 0.003 
 (-2.35) (0.90) (1.56) (-3.95) (1.84) (0.41) 
Growth 0.055*** 0.027*** 0.020*** 0.264*** -0.000 0.214*** 
 (12.74) (4.80) (2.70) (6.56) (-0.24) (4.53) 
LEV -0.084*** -0.015 0.004 0.024 -0.031* -0.059 
 (-3.80) (-0.38) (0.15) (0.12) (-1.66) (-0.21) 
ROE -0.057*** 0.005 0.034*** -0.228** 0.050*** -0.050 
 (-6.22) (0.61) (3.08) (-1.97) (4.13) (-0.55) 
Size -0.012*** -0.015*** -0.013*** -1.018*** -0.016*** -0.198*** 
 (-3.40) (-3.30) (-4.39) (-15.75) (-2.69) (-3.78) 
Capital_need -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.002** 0.000 -0.001 
 (-0.68) (-0.46) (-1.39) (-1.97) (0.12) (-1.34) 
Loss -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.004*** 0.004 -0.008*** -0.077*** 
 (-3.12) (-3.83) (-2.84) (0.18) (-4.92) (-4.53) 
Op_cycle -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000** 0.000 -0.000 
 (-1.61) (0.50) (1.49) (-1.97) (1.07) (-0.16) 
Inventory 0.083*** 0.116* 0.044 1.097*** 0.036** -0.017 
 (3.58) (1.81) (0.94) (3.40) (2.26) (-0.04) 
Intercept 0.104*** 0.099** 0.008 -0.042 -1.064*** 0.385 
 (3.28) (2.21) (0.33) (-0.06) (-46.18) (0.91) 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 695 667 713 715 596 548 
Adjusted R2 37.1% 16.0% 18.2% 53.3% 32.6% 19.3% 
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TABLE 4 
Comparison of conditional conservatism among different types of firms 
 
This table reports the results from the model outlined in Ball and Shivakumar (2006): 
∆ܰܫ௜,௧ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵ∆ܰܫ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߙଶܦ∆ܰܫ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߙଷ∆ܰܫ௜,௧ିଵ ൈ ܦ∆ܰܫ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߙସܥܴܯ௜ሺܷܴܵܯ௜ሻ ൅
ߙହ∆ܰܫ௜,௧ିଵ ൈ ܥܴܯ௜ሺܷܴܵܯ௜ሻ ൅ ߙ଺ܦ∆ܰܫ௜,௧ିଵ ൈ ܥܴܯ௜ሺܷܴܵܯ௜ሻ ൅ ߙ଻∆ܰܫ௜,௧ିଵ ൈ ܦ∆ܰܫ௜,௧ିଵ ൈ
ܥܴܯ௜ሺܷܴܵܯ௜ሻ ൅ ߝ௜,௧ , 
where, ∆NI is the change in net income scaled by lagged total assets and D∆NI is a dummy variable for 
negative ∆NI. The table reports the coefficient estimates, t-values based on standard errors adjusted for 
firm- and year-level clustering (in brackets), the number of observations, and the adjusted R2. All of the 
variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed t-test). Please see Appendix B for variable definitions. 
 U.S. RM vs. 
matched U.S. IPO 
firms 
(1) 
Chinese RM vs. 
Chinese ADR 
firms 
(2) 
Chinese RM vs. 
U.S. RM firms 
(3) 
ΔNIt-1 -0.253* 0.078** 0.025 
 (-1.82) (2.01) (0.97) 
DΔNIt-1 -0.014 0.046*** 0.036 
 (-0.27) (6.04) (1.28) 
ΔNIt-1 ×DΔNIt-1 -0.358*** -0.220*** -0.307*** 
 (-2.66) (-3.84) (-8.15) 
USRM -0.040   
 (-1.56)   
ΔNIt-1× USRM 0.009   
 (0.35)   
DΔNIt-1× USRM 0.254*   
 (1.73)   
ΔNIt-1× DΔNIt-1× USRM 0.008   
 (0.04)   
CRM  -0.007 -0.029 
  (-0.93) (-1.46) 
ΔNIt-1× CRM  0.020** 0.046** 
  (2.32) (2.02) 
DΔNIt-1× CRM  -0.018 0.125*** 
  (-0.45) (4.18) 
ΔNIt-1× DΔNIt-1× CRM  0.105** 0.108** 
  (2.10) (2.03) 
Intercept 0.124 -0.005 1.053*** 
 (1.17) (-0.20) (15.55) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes 
N 422 1,021 718 
Adjusted R2 34.8% 71.9% 71.5% 
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TABLE 5 
Comparison of restatement probability among different types of firms 
 
This table reports the Logit regression of the probability of restatement based on firm types:  
Pr(Restatementit )  1CRM it (orUSRM it )Controlsit-1
Year Dummies IndustryDummiesit  
The dependent variable, Restatement, is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the financial statement of the 
firm in that year is restated later, and 0 otherwise. The table reports the coefficient estimates, the 
corresponding Z statistics based on Wald chi-square adjusted for firm- and year-level clustering (in 
brackets), the number of observations, and the pseudo R2. All of the variables are winsorized at the 1% 
and 99% levels. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. Please see Appendix B for variable definitions. 
 U.S. RM vs. U.S. IPO 
firms 
(Model 1) 
Chinese RM vs. 
Chinese ADR firms 
(Model 2) 
Chinese RM vs. U.S. 
RM firms 
(Model 3) 
USRM -0.068   
 (-0.17)   
CRM  4.214*** 2.570*** 
  (5.79) (7.75) 
M/B 0.008 -0.065 0.032** 
 (0.60) (-0.90) (2.00) 
Growth 0.250 0.107 0.274* 
 (1.20) (0.72) (1.89) 
LEV -0.072 -0.261 -0.971 
 (-0.03) (-0.19) (-0.87) 
ROE -0.076 0.588 0.312 
 (-0.16) (1.42) (1.43) 
Size -0.045 -0.060 0.104 
 (-0.33) (-0.38) (0.84) 
Capital_need -2.008* 0.391*** 0.338* 
 (-1.77) (2.81) (1.94) 
Loss -0.449 1.256 0.349 
 (-0.54) (1.36) (0.44) 
Op_cycle -0.411 0.136 -0.504 
 (-0.70) (1.20) (-1.27) 
Inventory 2.681* -1.049 1.384 
 (1.68) (-0.83) (1.37) 
Intercept -1.858 -4.870*** -4.463*** 
 (-1.30) (-3.93) (-4.56) 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes 
N 412 1021 718 
Pseudo R2 12.4% 33.5% 19.6% 
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TABLE 6 
Sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance among U.S.-listed Chinese firms 
 
This table reports the following Logit regression on the probability of CEO turnover, based on Lel and 
Miller (2008): 
itti,
itii1-t i,it
DummiesIndustryDummiesYearControls
CRMPERCRMPERTurnoverCEO



  1,321)Pr(
 
CEO_Turnover is an indicator for CEO turnover, equal to 1 if there is a change in CEO in that year and 0 
otherwise; PER is measured in two alternative ways: (1) the natural logarithm of one plus the ratio of 
earnings before interest and tax over total assets and (2) the natural logarithm of one plus industry-
adjusted stock return. Please see Appendix B for the definitions of other variables. The table reports the 
coefficient estimates, the corresponding Z statistics adjusted for firm- and year-level clustering (in 
brackets), the number of observations, and the pseudo R2. All of the variables are winsorized at the 1% 
and 99% levels. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively.  
 
 (1) (2) 
 Performance measure: 
ROA 
Performance measure: 
Industry adjusted stock returns 
PER -4.804*** -0.389*** 
 (-3.05) (-22.66) 
CRM -0.919*** -2.692*** 
 (-4.26) (-5.32) 
PER×CRM 4.106*** 0.368** 
 (2.99) (2.05) 
M/B -0.009 -0.038 
 (-0.23) (-1.31) 
Growth -1.532*** -1.886*** 
 (-3.44) (-3.11) 
LEV -1.131 -0.663 
 (-1.37) (-0.50) 
Size 0.175*** 0.115 
 (2.73) (1.46) 
Capital_need 0.084 0.099 
 (0.31) (0.35) 
Loss 0.055 0.237** 
 (0.65) (2.30) 
Op_cycle -0.287*** -1.165* 
 (-4.29) (-1.70) 
Inventory -2.418 -5.069 
 (-0.90) (-1.62) 
Intercept 4.206* 10.665*** 
 (1.91) (7.77) 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes 
N 940 619 
Pseudo R2 28.91% 32.93% 
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TABLE 7 
Corporate governance and financial reporting quality of U.S.-listed Chinese firms 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics on corporate governance characteristics of Chinese RM firms and 
Chinese ADR firms 
 
This table reports descriptive statistics on corporate governance characteristics of Chinese RM firms and 
Chinese ADR firms, and the p-value for the difference between the two samples. There are 604 
observations from Chinese RM firms and 745 from Chinese ADR firms. (The sample for Panel B is 
smaller due to additional data requirement.) Inside_own is the percentage of the officer and director 
ownership. Foreign_Own is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has at least one large foreign 
owner (ownership greater than 10%). BD_Size is the size of the board. BD_Independence is the 
percentage of outside directors on the board. CEO_Chair is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the 
CEO is also the chairman of the firm. Founder_CEO is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the CEO is 
the founder. CEO_Option is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has exercisable options 
outstanding for the CEO in that year.  
 
 P-value for T-test and 
Wilcoxon Z 
test for differences in
 
Chinese RM firms Chinese ADR firms
 Mean Median Std Mean Median Std Mean Median
Inside_own 0.37 0.37 0.24 0.21 0.17 0.22 0.001 0.001
Foreign_Own 0.05 0.00 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.15 0.001 0.001
BD_Size 5.51 5.00 1.75 7.76 7.00 2.51 0.001 0.001
BD_Independence 0.57 0.60 0.22 0.59 0.60 0.16 0.007 0.001
CEO_Chair 0.83 1.00 0.51 0.60 1.00 0.49 0.001 0.001
Founder_CEO 0.46 0.00 0.61 0.51 1.00 0.50 0.071 0.015
CEO_Option 0.47 0.00 0.50 0.79 1.00 0.41 0.001 0.001
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TABLE 7 (Cont’d) 
Panel B: Regression of financial reporting quality among U.S.-listed Chinese firms 
Column (1) replicates the analysis reported in Panel B of Table 3 based on the sample of U.S. listed 
Chinese firms with required data on corporate governance, financial reporting quality, and control 
variables. Column (2) reports results from regressing the financial reporting quality measures on the fitted 
value (CRM_P) estimated from the Chinese RM and Chinese ADR selection model and the corresponding 
residual value (CRM_R). For the selection model, the dependent variable is CRM and the independent 
variables include insider ownership, an indicator for large foreign investor with ownership 10% or higher, 
board size, board independence, whether CEO is the chairman of the board, and whether CEO is the 
founder, and an indicator variable for firms with exercisable options outstanding for their CEOs. 
ititititit ContorlsCRM_RCRM_PFRQ   321  
The table reports the coefficient estimates, t-values adjusted for firm- and year-level clustering (in 
brackets), the number of observations, and the adjusted R2. All of the variables are winsorized at the 1% 
and 99% levels. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively (two-tailed t-tests). Please see Appendix B for the definitions of other variables. 
 Column (1) Column (2) 
CRM 0.316***  
 (3.01)  
CRM_P  0.412*** 
  (3.09) 
CRM_R  0.114*** 
  (3.57) 
M/B 0.001 -0.000 
 (0.05) (-0.02) 
Growth 0.444*** 0.378*** 
 (6.97) (8.68) 
LEV -0.058 -0.136 
 (-0.24) (-0.67) 
ROE -0.455*** -0.453*** 
 (-3.23) (-3.83) 
Size -0.162*** -0.127*** 
 (-6.46) (-5.37) 
Capital_Need 0.021 0.005 
 (0.38) (0.11) 
Loss -0.004 -0.003 
 (-0.17) (-0.17) 
Op_cycle 0.119** 0.173*** 
 (2.33) (2.63) 
Inventory 1.146** 1.116** 
 (2.46) (2.43) 
Intercept -0.591* -0.608** 
 (-1.92) (-2.47) 
Year effects Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes 
N 824 824 
Adjusted R2  48.7% 51.4% 
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TABLE 8 
The variation of financial reporting quality within Chinese RM firms 
This table reports the regression results within Chinese RM firms based on the following regression 
model: 
ܨܴܳ௜௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܥܴܯ_ܥ݄ܽݎܽܿݐ݁ݎ௜௧ ൅ ߚଶܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧ 
CRM_Character is one of the following variables: Governance, Big4, EquityIssue, and IPO_Qualify. 
Governance is the common factor based on the governance variables used in Panel A of Table 7; Big4 is 
an indicator for Big4 auditor, equal to 1 if the auditor is one of the Big 4 auditing firms and 0 otherwise; 
EquityIssue is an indicator for equity issuance, equal to 1 if the firm undertakes a seasoned equity 
offering, PIPE, or other private placement; and Qualify is an indicator for IPO qualification and it equals 
1 if the firm is qualified to be listed on a Chinese stock exchange at the time of entering the U.S. equity 
market, and 0 otherwise. The table reports the coefficient estimates, t-values based on standard error 
adjusted for firm- and year-level clustering (in brackets), the number of observations, and the adjusted R2. 
All of the variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed t-test). Please see Appendix B for the 
definitions of other variables. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Governance -0.316**    
 (-2.12)    
BIG4  -0.671**   
  (-2.15)   
EquityIssue   3.389***  
   (5.42)  
IPO_Qualify    0.194* 
    (1.71) 
M/B -0.001 0.021 -0.002 -0.011 
 (-0.04) (0.84) (-0.09) (-0.94) 
Growth 0.784*** 0.342*** -0.002 0.688*** 
 (5.88) (3.99) (-0.09) (8.08) 
LEV 1.041 1.014* 0.649*** 0.718** 
 (1.41) (1.87) (5.39) (2.31) 
ROE -0.243 0.600*** 0.571 -0.066 
 (-0.84) (2.77) (0.81) (-0.44) 
Size -0.545*** -0.390*** 0.150 -0.368*** 
 (-5.81) (-5.06) (0.51) (-8.03) 
Capital_Need 0.276 0.079 -0.489*** 0.083 
 (1.51) (0.69) (-4.73) (0.88) 
Loss -0.183*** -0.080 0.051 -0.117*** 
 (-3.27) (-0.36) (0.29) (-3.75) 
Op_cycle 0.747*** 0.132 -0.140*** 0.701*** 
 (4.25) (1.19) (-2.73) (7.14) 
Inventory 0.697 1.591** 0.494*** -0.990* 
 (0.59) (2.01) (2.78) (-1.75) 
Intercept 1.253* 1.860** 2.123*** 0.575 
 (1.72) (2.53) (2.89) (1.29) 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 290 290 290 290 
Adjusted R2  49.4% 37.8% 39.5% 47.1% 
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TABLE 9 
Analysis of earnings response coefficient 
This table reports regression results from the following model: 
		ܷܴ௜௧ 			ൌ ߙଵ ൅ ߚଵܷܧ௜௧ ൅ ߚଶܥܴܯ௜൅ߚଷܷܧ௜௧ ൈ ܥܴܯ௜ ൅ ∑ ߚ௞ܥܱܴܱܰܶܮ ௜ܵ௧ ൅ ∑ ߚ௞ሾܷܧ௜௧ ൈଽ௞ୀ଻଺௞ୀସܥܱܴܱܰܶܮ ௜ܵ௧ሿ ൅ ߝ௜௧     ܷܴ௜௧ is the cumulative abnormal returns in the three-day window around the earnings announcement date 
for firm i in year t, where the abnormal return is defined as the firm’s return less the CRSP value-
weighted market return. ܷܧ௜௧ is firm i’s unexpected annual earnings in year t; it is measured as the change 
in earnings scaled by stock price at the end of the fiscal year t. Please see Appendix B for the definition of 
control variables. The table reports the coefficient estimates, the corresponding t-statistics based on 
standard errors adjusted for firm- and year-level clustering, the number of observations, and adjusted R2. 
All of the variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed t-test). 
 
 Chinese RM vs. U.S. 
IPO firms 
(Model 1) 
Chinese RM vs. U.S. 
RM firms 
(Model 2) 
Chinese RM vs. Chinese 
ADR firms 
(Model 3) 
UE 0.092** 0.070* 0.060** 
 (2.24) (1.83) (2.27) 
CRM -0.009 -0.009 0.003 
 (-1.16) (-0.69) (0.65) 
UE×CRM 0.011 0.002 0.001 
 (0.99) (0.07) (0.12) 
M/B 0.002* -0.000 0.002*** 
 (1.76) (-0.29) (2.88) 
Size 0.012*** 0.011** 0.003** 
 (3.14) (2.16) (2.43) 
Loss 0.002 0.002 0.001 
 (0.24) (0.20) (0.31) 
UE×M/B 0.014** 0.000 0.006 
 (2.20) (0.09) (0.59) 
UE×Size -0.016** -0.017 -0.006 
 (-2.34) (-1.55) (-1.49) 
UE×Loss 0.016 0.073* 0.020** 
 (1.05) (1.89) (2.31) 
Intercept -0.180*** -0.037 0.023 
 (-8.86) (-0.80) (0.98) 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
N 364 465 745 
Adjusted R2 0.254 0.073 0.188 
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TABLE 10 
Chinese RM firms’ financial reporting quality and future stock return 
This table reports regression results from the following model: 
		ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௧ା௝ ൌ ߙଵ ൅ ߚଵܨܴܳ௅ைௐ௜,௧ ൅ ߛܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧ ൅ ߜܻ݁ܽݎ	ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ ൅ ߠܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ	݀ݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ ൅ ߝ௜௧   
Returni+j is cumulated annual stock return calculated based on stock prices at four months after the fiscal 
year end, where j is t+1, t+2, or t+3. Stock prices are adjusted for delisting. Returns for forced delisting 
are set as -100%.  FRQ_LOW is a dummy variable that equals one if the common factor based on accrual 
measures, FRQ, is lower than the sample median value and 0 otherwise. Please see Appendix B for the 
definition of control variables. The table reports the coefficient estimates, the corresponding t-statistics 
based on standard errors adjusted for firm- and year-level clustering, the number of observations, and 
adjusted R2. All of the variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed t-test). 
 
 Returnt+1 Returnt+2 Returnt+3 
FRQ_LOW -0.265* -0.550** -0.612** 
 (-1.71) (-2.16) (-2.06) 
ROE -0.607** -0.201 -0.223 
 (-2.10) (-0.33) (-0.25) 
M/B -0.027 -0.005 -0.206** 
 (-1.17) (-0.08) (-2.25) 
Growth 0.127 0.192 0.376* 
 (1.11) (1.08) (1.74) 
LEV 0.649* 0.976** 2.592*** 
 (1.84) (2.59) (3.12) 
Size 0.482*** 0.482*** 0.589** 
 (4.47) (3.08) (2.26) 
Intercept -2.173*** -2.215*** -0.918 
 (-13.78) (-4.37) (-0.50) 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
N 138 114 114 
Adjusted R2 0.452 0.458 0.612 
 
 
 
